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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78A-3-102 (2016 and Utah R. App. P. Rule 51. This Court granted certiorari 
on the Court of Appeals' holding in Penunuri v. Sundance Partners Ltd., 2016 UT App. 
154, 380 P.3d 3, on November 1, 2016 docket no. 20160683. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue #1. 
Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the standard stated in Berry 
v. Greater Park City, Co. 2007 UT 87, ,I27, 171 P.3d 442, and White v. Dees/ehorst, 879 
P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994), for summary judgment should be read as permitting 
judgment solely on the grounds that reasonable minds could not find in favor of the 
plaintiff in a negligence case in which the standard of care is not fixed by law. 
Standard of Review 
Because a grant of summary judgment by definition involves conclusions of law, 
the Supreme Court of Utah affords no difference to an appellate court's decision and 
reviews it for correctness. See Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87 at ,I8, 171 
P .3d 442. In addition, appellate courts "views all facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." See Penunuri v. 
Sundance Partners Ltd., 2016 UT App. 154, ,I15. 
1 
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Statement and citation to the record that this issue was presented in the petition for 
certiorari or fairly included therein. 
This issue was presented in the petition for certiorari and/or fairly included therein 
at pages 1, 12-16. This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. at 586-587 and Oral 
Argument at 1575 pp.26-27. 
Issue #2 
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's determination 
that reasonable minds must conclude that there was no gross negligence under the 
circumstances. 
Standard of Review 
Because a grant of summary judgment by definition involves conclusions of law, 
[Appellate Courts] afford no difference to the district court's decision and review it for 
® correctness." See Berry, 2007 UT 87, at 18, In addition, appellate courts "views all facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." See Penunuri, 2016 UT App. 154, at ,Il5. 
Statement and citation to the record that this issue was presented in the petition for 
certiorari or fairly included therein. 
This issue was presented in the petition for certiorari and fairly included therein at 
pages 2-3, 4-11, 12-16, and 16-18. This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. at 
590-607, 581-586 and Oral Argument at 1575 pp. 50-53. Bench Ruling at 1576 p 5-9. 
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Issue #3 
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's award of e 
deposition costs to Appellees/Defendant. 
Standard of Review 
A trial court's "decision to award the prevailing party its costs will be reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard." Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 1140,130 P.3d 
325. But "[c]osts were not recoverable at common law; and are therefore generally 
allowable only in the amounts and in the manner provided by statute," Frampton v. 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773, (Utah 1980) therefore, questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness and the Supreme Court affords no difference to the lower court's decision. 
Berry, 2007 UT 87, ,I8. 
Statement and citation to the record that this issue was presented in the petition for 
certiorari or fairly included therein. 
This issue was presented in the petition for certiorari and fairly included therein at 
pages 1 and 18-19. This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1425-1437, 1438-1447, and 
1448-1455, oral argument at 1577 and R. at 1468-1477. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. (Addendum A) 
2. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54. (Addendum A) 
ADDENDUMS 
ADDENDUM A. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 56 and Rule 54. 
ADDENDUM B. Court of Appeal's opinion, Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 
2016 UT App. 154, 380 P.3d 3. 
3 
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ADDENDUM C. Trial Court Orders. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: On August 1, 2007 Lisa Penunuri went on a 
guided horse ride at Sundance Stables, where she was thrown from her horse, which 
fractured her neck. Lisa Penunuri alleges that Sundance et al. was grossly negligent 
when it's guide Ashley, allowed large gaps to form between the horses while she lead the 
guided horse ride and that because of the large gaps, Ms. Penunuri' s horse dangerously 
accelerated causing her to fall which caused a C5-C7 subluxation fracture of her neck (R. 
at 1-14). 
The undisputed facts are: Rocky Mountain Outfitters' ("RMO") guide's own 
training manual warns its guides that when large gaps form between horses, they will 
cause horses to dangerously accelerate (R. 898); That RMO's guides are solely 
responsible for preventing gaps from forming (R. 898); To the novice rider these 
dangerous accelerations come unexpectedly and cause a significant risk of falling off the 
horse (R. 898); RMO's expert, Rex Walker, testified that a horse will likely dangerously 
accelerate if gaps extend to three horse lengths (R. 590); A horse length is 7 to 8 feet long 
(R. 1009); RMO's owner, Joseph Loveridge, testified that a horse will likely accelerate 
when two to three horse length gaps form between the horses (R. 590); RMO's guide, 
Braydon Whitely who had worked with RMO's horses and who was very familiar with 
RMO's horses, testified that RMO's horse are likely to accelerate when the gap is three to 
four horse lengths apart (R. 590), but that RMO's horses will certainly and unexpectedly 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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[to a novice] accelerate if the gap reaches 10 horse lengths (i.e. 80 feet) (R. 644); at the 
time that Ms. Penunuri' s horse accelerated and threw her to the ground, the guide had Ci 
permitted a gap of 125 feet, or fifteen and a half horse lengths (R. 597). By every 
experienced equestrian's calculation, it was imminent that Ms. Penunuri's horse was 
going to suddenly accelerate to catch up with the other horses (R. 590). 
RMO's guide's training manual warns that hikers, steep hills, etc. pose additional 
dangers and that the guide must warn the riders that they are coming upon dangers (R. 
898). According to RMO's owner, Mr. Loveridge, hikers pose a greater risk when the 
guide has permitted gaps to form in the train of horses (R. 590). Ms. Penunuri's guide 
not only allowed a gap of 125 feet, or over fifteen horse lengths to grow, but she then 
passed some hikers who were hiding in the woods on the inside of a curve after a steep 
climb (R. 594 ). Ms. Penunuri's expert, Scott Earl, testified that the sharp bend, the steep 
incline, and the hikers all posed an additional risk to the riders, and at that point in time 
the guide was required to have all the horses between one to two horse lengths apart (R. 
946, 949-950). At the time that the gaps had formed, the only person who could have 
closed the gaps was the guide, but the guide instead decided to continue up the trail 
another 100 feet with full knowledge of the dangers that the gap combined with the three 
other dangers posed to Ms. Penunuri and in utter disregard for the safety of the trailing 
guests (R. at 594, 898). 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: On January 3, 2008 Lisa Penunuri and her 
husband Barry Siegwart commenced a personal injury action in the Fourth District Court, 
State of Utah. On January 19, 2010 the trial court dismissed Ms. Penunuri's ordinary 
5 
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negligence claims based upon a pre-injury release Ms. Penunuri signed. Ms. Penunuri 
@ appealed to the validity of the pre-injury release based upon the Equine Act. The trial 
court at that time did not release the gross negligence claims. The Utah Court of Appeals 
and the Supreme Court of Utah on Certiorari found the pre-injury release valid and Ms. 
Penunuri' s ordinary negligence claims were dismissed leaving only her claim for gross 
negligence. On September 20, 2013 RMO filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to 
Dismiss Ms. Penunuri's gross negligence claims. On September 9, 2014 the trial court 
granted RMO's Motion for Summary Judgment on gross negligence. The trial court 
thereafter granted RMO's award of deposition costs. On September 9, 2014 Ms. 
ij) Penunuri filed her notice of appeal. On November 21, 2014 the Supreme Court of Utah 
elected not to retain jurisdiction and poured the case over to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
On July 21, 2016 the Utah Court of Appeals issued their opinion, affirming the trial 
court's decision on gross negligence and on costs. On November 1, 2016 this Supreme 
Court of Utah granted certiorari on the gross negligence claim and the award of costs. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Rocky Mountain Outfitter's ("RMO") guide's instruction manual provides: 
[t]ake your responsibility seriously. Guests trust you with their safety and 
often with the safety of their children. They look to you for experience, 
instruction, leadership, and knowledge. They also look to you for fun and 
entertainment. They look to you to make their experience exactly what 
they want it to be -fun, memorable, exciting, and safe. (Record on Appeal 
at pages 1252, 1575 p. 39). 
And: 
Once on the trail, it is the guide's responsibility to continua/Iv watch over 
and monitor the safety and comfort of his/her guests. 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1. Keep your ride in control. Keep guests in site [sic] at all times possible. 
While there are times that they will be unseen constant interaction with 
guests will help keep a controlled environment. 
2. Adiust )!_our pace so that large gaf!.S do not (!Jrm between horses in 
)!_Our string. GaJ!.S encourage horses to trot un-exf!.ectedll!_. 
3. Advise your guests o[_ uecoming obstacles that may be difficult or 
intimidating. Teach them what to do and assure them they will be o.k. 
( Ue-hills, down hills, tree branch, logs, hikers, etc.) 
4. Continually_ remind guests o[_sa[§tv issues, re-teaching as you go. 
5. Re-assess the tightness of saddles and remind guests to inform you if 
they feel their saddle slipping from one side to the other. 
6. Constant/)!_ have safJfy__ on )!_our mind! (Emphasis added) 
(R. 898, 1252, 1575 at p. 40,42). 
2. According to Penunuri's expert, Scott Earl, the standard of care is "common sense" 
among horse people [riders]. (R. 1066, 1070). 
3. Penunuri' s expert testified that the gaps caused Penunuri' s horse to accelerate, which 
in turn caused her to fall. (R. 941-942, 946). 
4. There was a gap of approximately 16 horse lengths (125 feet) between Penunuri and 
the horse she was following. (R. 1261). 
5. The length of a horse is seven to eight feet long. (R. 1009, 614, 958, 599). 
6. RMO's employee manual instructed their guides to prevent large gaps between 
horses, and to warn riders about dangers on the trail. (R. 898, 1252, 1575 at p. 40, 
42). 
7. Joseph Loveridge, the owner ofRMO, testified that gaps should be no more than two 
to three horse lengths (16-24 feet). (R. 590, 1253). 
7 
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8. Rex Walker, RMO's hired expert, testified that the gaps should be kept at two to 
@ three horse lengths (16-24 feet). (R. 590, 1253). 
9. Bray don Whiteley, another guide for RMO, testified that gaps should not extend 
beyond one to two horse lengths (8-10 feet). (R. 590, 1253). 
10. Penunuri' s expert Scott Earl testified that the horses should be less than four horse 
lengths (32 feet) but when the horses came upon the steep hill, sharp turn, and hikers, 
the horses had to be one to two horse lengths (8-16 feet) apart. (R.1256, 941-942, 
p.89-90). 
11.Braydon Whiteley, who as a guide at RMO was particularly familiar with RMO's 
horses, testified that "three horse lengths is probably a bit too far, three to four horse 
lengths." He testified that a gap of three to four horse lengths (24-32 feet) may likely 
cause RMO's horses to accelerate unexpectedly, but a gap of ten horse lengths (80 
feet) will cause a horse to accelerate unexpectedly. (R. 644, 632, 1262). 
12. Joseph Loveridge testified that gaps can cause a horse to trot unexpectedly, and that 
when a hiker is on the trail, it is even more important to keep the gaps closed. (R. 
590, 1254). 
13. Where Penunuri fell, she was 102 feet behind Ms. Fort on the trail. Ashley Write 
testified that Penunuri' s horse began to accelerate 23 feet before she landed on the 
ground, totaling 125 feet (16 horse lengths). (R. 597, 1261). 
14. RMO agreed that the gap between the horses was 125 feet at the moment Ms. 
Penunuri's horse came upon the steep section, bend, and hikers. (R. 1261). 
8 
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15. The only time RMO contended that Ashley Wright was slowing down the whole ride 
was in its reply memorandum fact section and they contend that the reason she did 
not stop was because Ms. Penunuri and an eight-year-old child had stopped. The 
statement was not presented as an undisputed fact, but was made in response to one 
of Ms. Penunuri's undisputed facts. (R. 1259-1260). 
16. None of the other riders corroborated the statement, but testified just the opposite. 
The other riders were concerned that the child and Lisa had gotten too far behind and 
were asking for the guide to slow down so they could catch up. Rather than slow 
down, in response to the requests to slow down and close the gaps, the guide stated 
that she would instead go up the trail another 100 feet to pony Haley's horse. (R. ti) 
600-601, the fact was presented in Ms. Penunuri' s opposition as an undisputed fact, 
RMO did not dispute it in its reply memorandum,1261-1264). 
17. Suzanne Moag, a rider at the front of the group, testified that she was asking the 
guide to stop and wait until everyone caught up. (R. 848). 
18. Ashley, the guide herself, testified in opposition to RMO's contention, stating that 
the child and Penunuri were not stopped but were slowly continuing up the trail while 
the guide chose to continue to ride ahead another I 00 feet. (R. 614 ). 
19. The guide had an opportunity to close the gaps when she came upon the hikers after 
having just climbed a short steep section of trail and rounded a sharp bend. (R. 594). 
20. The guide could have stopped and waited for the riders to catch up before she passed 
the hikers. (R. 594, 966-967, 907-912). 
9 
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21. Penunuri's expert testified that the breach in the standard of care was the guide's 
failure to stop the moment she came upon the hikers to close the large gaps that had 
formed. (R. 594, 941-942, pp 89-90; 943, p. 85 lines 22-23; 949, p. 58-59). 
22. Mr. Earl Testified: · 
A. There's several factors that could have - or in my opinion, several things 
that could have startled that horse and caused it to start running, going 
around a blind curve, not seeing the other horses at the time, being a 
distance, wanting to catch up. I'm not even saying it was startled. 
Q. Just may have wanted to catch up? 
A. Yes, and they will accelerate to catch up. (R. at 396, 594, 949, 1248 and 
1259-1260)(Also argued in open court at 1575, p. 48-49). 
Q. In fact, Lisa testified that that occurred more than one time on the trail ride, 
that the horse did catch up, that it, giddy upped a little bit. 
A. But people on a curve, and I'm not saying the people did anything wrong 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
* * * 
Q. 
whatsoever, they might have not moved, but there's a possibility that the 
horse didn't realize that they were there until he was right there, and then it 
startles him. 
But you don't really have an opinion as to why the horse-
There is a few things that I have read in the testimonies, that I would have 
an opinion that could have caused the horse to accelerate. 
Okay, And would some of those causes -would all of those causes because 
of the negligence of the guide? 
If the space would have been not there, the distance, that - all of those 
causes could have been minimalized, or the factor of the horse 
accelerating. (R. 948-949, p. 61-62). 
Is it safer to keep the horses moving than to have the horses stop by the 
people? 
10 
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A. If your horses are together, it is safer to continue on and to acknowledge, to 
make sure everybody is aware that there are people there. 
Q. But you would agree that the unpredictability of an animal's reaction to a 
person on a trail is an inherent risk associated with horseback riding? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, but vou can eliminate or minimize the risk of that. (R. 955, p. 36 
Lines) 
* * * 
And as she bends around the corner, is it a breach in the standard of care 
not to have waited, at that point, to have gotten all of those horses back 
together? 
A. Yes. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
So at that point, even if they were three or four horse lengths apart, the fact 
of the matter is, she had to get them back to one or two right? 
Yes, in mv opinion, she should have. 
. .. It's a breach in her duty not to have gotten those back to one and two 
before she came around the danger, before she saw -
A. After seeing the people and knowing there was danger, ves. 
Q. And so she breached her duty, at that point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at that point, she's negligent; is that correct? 
A. That would be correct. (R. 941-942, p.89-90). 
23. Mr. Earl also testified: 
Q. . . . Third, Ashley further breached her duty to keep the riders safe when 
she failed to stop the moment she came around the bend in the trail where 
hikers were waiting in the bushes to let the horses pass. There should be 
no gaps in the horses at any time, but when the horses are coming upon a 
situation that could startle them, extra care should be taken to get the horses 
together before the straggling horses come upon the situation. 
11 
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Now, your statement there, that there should be no gaps in the horses 
at any time. That's an impossibility; right? 
A. No gaps as in, you know, you're going to have gaps. What is meant there, I 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
* * * 
Q. 
guess it isn't written correctly, large gaps. 
And again, how would you define a large gap? 
I would sav at this point, vou should be one to two horse lengths apart. 
There other points where it's okay to be further apart? 
You should be one to two horse lengths apart at all times, but when you 're 
coming up to a danger, to minimize any risks, make sure you 're there. 
And so you 're saying is there should have been extra care to be taken to 
get the horses together before the straggling horses comes upon the 
situation? 
A. That is exactly what I'm saying. (R. 949-950, pp 57-59). 
23. As to causation, Mr. Earl testified: 
Q. . .. And then as I reread [your report], I realized what you are saying is just 
slow the train down and let everybody catch up and then [the hikers can] let 
the horses go by? 
A. 
* * * 
Q. 
See, they can go by people, bridges, water crossings, you're better off to be 
together at a so-called danger. (R. 947, p 68 lines 10-16). 
Just for clarification, what do you believe caused Lisa [Penunuri] to fall off 
the horse? 
A. I believe the large gaps, which allowed the horse to accelerate 
unexpectedly, that she lost her seating and fell. (R. 946. P 72 lines 14-18). 
24. The guide Ashley Wright specifically testified: 
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A. Obviously [Haley's] horse was moving because it got into the open 
space as I was turning around to grab it. So her horse moved, yes. (R. 614 ). 
25. And, in regards to Ms. Penunuri's horse, Ashley Wright the guide testified: 
A. And from me going the 100 feet of where I said that, Lisa [Ms. 
Penunuri] was not just sitting there. So I didn't go 100 feet away from Lisa 
as she was stopped, no. (R. 614). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Ms. Penunuri's position is that the Berry v. Greater Park City, Co.1 and White v. 
• 
Deeslehorst, 2 two-part test holding that summary judgment is "inappropriate unless the @ 
applicable standard of care is fixed by law, and reasonable minds could reach but one 
conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the circumstances," is still or should be 
the rule governing gross negligence claims.3 Ms. Penunuri contends that Blaisdell v. 
Dentrix Dental Sys., lnc.,4 was much narrower than applied by the court of appeals in 
Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. and was not intended to apply to gross negligence 
cases where reasonable minds could find that a defendant breached the standard of care 
in ordinary negligence (In Blaisdell, the plaintiff could not have established ordinary 
negligence and the plaintiff did not plead gross negligence )5. When a plaintiff ~ 
demonstrates that a defendant is negligent, then it should be a jury determination as to 
how far from the standard of care the defendant deviated and if it reached the level of 
gross negligence. 
1 See 2007 UT 87, 127, 171 P.3d 442, 
2 See 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994), 
3 See Berry, 2007 UT 87 at 127 
4 See 2012 UT 37,284 P.3d 616 
5 See 2012 UT 37, at ,I13 and 17). 
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Ms. Penunuri further contends, that even if the court of appeals correctly 
@ determined that this Supreme Court meant disjunctive instead of conjunctive and that the 
summary judgment rule on gross negligence is actually, "inappropriate unless the 
applicable standard of care is fixed by law, [eHd or] reasonable minds could reach but 
one conclusion as the defendant's negligence under the circumstances,"6 the particular 
facts to this case do not justify the grant of summary judgment. It was undisputed that 
gaps in a train of horses of 32 feet or greater will cause a trailing horse to suddenly and 
dangerously accelerate to catch up to the herd and that once gaps form only the guide can 
eliminate them. If a guided train of horses comes upon dangers such as hikers, sharp 
Cj bends in the trail, and steep sections of the trail then the gaps need to be less than 16 feet 
in length, or the horse will unexpectedly accelerate. 
It is undisputed that the guide permitted a gap of 125 feet grow in her train of 
horses and that she simultaneously came upon a sharp bend, a steep section of trail, and 
hikers hiding in the shrubs inside the curve, all three are known dangers to riders, and the 
guide nonetheless proceeded with utter disregard to the danger that the combination 
would cause the straggling riders. It is undisputed that at the moment Ms. Penunuri' s 
horse rounded the bend her horse suddenly accelerated and threw her off fracturing her 
neck. Ms. Penunuri' s expert testified that it was the gaps that caused the sudden 
acceleration, and without the gaps Ms. Penunuri' s horse likely would not have 
accelerated. Ms. Penunuri further contends that "slight care" as a defense, requires that 
the slight care be related to the actual act of negligence. The actual act of negligence was 
6 See Penunuri, 2016 UT App. 154 at ,r20 
14 
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passing the three dangers with a gap of 125 feet in her train of horses, the slight care 
would naturally have to relate to what she does at the moment she came upon the • 
dangers, not what she did before or what she planned on doing later. 
Lastly, the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's grant of costs to 
RMO. The case was dismissed at the summary judgment stage and not at trial, therefore 
to award costs the district court had to find that the case was so complex in nature that 
discovery could not be accomplished through less expensive methods of interrogatories, 
requests for admissions, and requests for the production of documents. The trial court 
admittedly did not find it was so complex or that the discovery could not be 
accomplished through less expensive methods, therefore the trial court inappropriately ~ 
granted RMO's costs. 
ARGUMENT 
To prove a claim of negligence Penunuri must establish four elements: ( 1) that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) that the defendant breached the duty; (3) the 
breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries; and (4) plaintiff suffered 
injuries. 7 "In establishing the existence of a duty, the same analysis is used for both a 
negligence and a gross negligence claim. The difference between the two lies in the 
degree of [ deviation from the standard of] care to which the defendant is held. "8 
7 Torrie v. Weber County, 2013 UT 48, ,I 9,309 P.3d 216. 
8 Madsen v. Borthick, 850 P.2d 442,444 (Utah 1993) 
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I. Summary Judgment ls Inappropriate When The Standard of Care Is Not Fixed 
BvLaw 
The court of appeals erred in concluding that the standard of care in Berry v. 
Greater Park City, Co. and White v. Deeslehorst, for summary judgment should be read 
as permitting judgment solely on the grounds that reasonable minds could not find in 
favor of the plaintiff in a negligence case in which the standard of care is not fixed by 
law. In Berry and White this Supreme Court held that in gross negligence, "summary 
Ci judgment is 'inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is fixed by law, and 
reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under 
the circumstances. "'9 As a general rule, summary judgment is inappropriate in cases of 
alleged negligence, 10 and "[ o ]rdinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required 
standard of care is a question of fact for the jury ." 11 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held, "where the standard of care is not 'fixed by 
law,' the determination of the appropriate standard of care is a factual issue to be resolved 
by the trier of fact." 12 In Berry the Supreme Court explained, "Utah courts will not grant 
@ summary judgment in a gross negligence case where the applicable standard of care has 
not been fixed by law because '[i]dentification of the proper standard of care is a 
necessary precondition to assessing the degree to which conduct deviates, if at all, from 
9 See 2007 UT 87, ,r 27, 171 P.3d. 442 (quoting White & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985). 
<ii 10 See Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987). 
11 See Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). 
12 See Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87 at ,30, 171 P.3d 442. 
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the standard of care - the core test in any claim of gross negligence. "'13 For a "standard 
of care . . . to be 'fixed by law' a statute or judicial precedent must articulate specific • 
standards" for gaps permitted in between horses during a guided horse ride.14 There are 
no statutes and there are no judicial precedents, therefore the standard of care for gaps 
within a guided trail ride is not "fixed by law." 
The court of appeals in this case altered the rule created in Wycalis and articulated 
in Berry and White, by changing an "and" to an "or" specifically stating the Supreme 
Court in Blaisdell interpreted the "Berry test in the disjunctive rather than conjunctive 
elements."15 In effect the court of appeals in Penunuri altered the rule to "summary 
judgment is inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is fixed by law tllHI or • 
reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under 
the circumstances."16 Blaisdell did not change the rule, it just reiterated a different rule 
regarding gross negligence, that if a Plaintiff does not have facts to establish ordinary 
negligence then the plaintiff would not have the facts to establish gross negligence. 17 
Comparing Berry to Blaisdell reveals this simple rule. 
In Berry this Supreme Court determined that a showing of possible ordinary 
negligence was sufficient to preclude summary judgment on gross negligence. 18 In Berry 
13 See Id quoting Berry, 2007 UT 87 at if 30, 171 P .3d 442, 449. 
14 See Id; and Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation, 2008 UT 13,,r 26, 179 P.3d 760, 768. 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
15 See Penunuri, 2016 UT App. 154 at ,r20. 
16 See Id. 
17 See Blaisdell, 2012 UT 37, ,r 13, 15 and 17. 
18 See Berry, 2007 UT 87 at ,r,r28-29. 
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a ski racer was injured while on a skiercross course (racecourse). 19 The facts that 
@ precluded summary judgment on gross negligence were, "testimony of an experienced ski 
racer, coach, and jumper who witnessed Mr. Berry's accident and faulted the jump's 
design [ and a] second expert in ski racecourse design and safety was likewise critical of 
the configuration of the accident site."20 The Berry Court determined that this was 
sufficient for ordinary negligence and since the parties had not directed the court to a 
standard of care applicable to the design of a skiercross course there also was sufficient 
evidence to go forward with a gross negligence claim.21 The Berry Court determined that 
the facts that could have shown the defendant had exhibited slight care were irrelevant 
@ when there was no "identified applicable standard of care to ground the [gross 
negligence] analysis ... "22 
In Blaisdell, there simply were no facts to establish a claim for ordinary 
negligence. 23 In Blaisdell the plaintiff dentist alleged that the defendant was responsible 
and negligent for the lost data on his patients when the plaintiffs employee installed the 
defendant's software on his computers.24 But the facts did not support that the defendant 
was negligent, they showed that the plaintiffs employee was negligent.25 The plaintiff 
was "well aware of the potential for data loss with the installation of the [defendant's] 
19 See Id. at ,r2. 
20 See Id at if28. 
21 See Id at ,r,r28-30. 
22 See Id at ,r,r 29-30 In 
23 See Blaisdell, 2012 UT 37 at ,r,r 4, 13-16. In Blaisdell, the plaintiff did not make a 
@ claim for gross negligence. 
24 See Id at ,r,r 3-5. 
25 See Id at ,r,r 3, 13-15. 
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software [ and] that the licensing agreement allocated the risk of data loss to the party 
with the best ability to prevent such a loss."26 The plaintiff was responsible to have a {45) 
backup copy of the data so that if defendant's software caused the data to be lost the 
plaintiff could reinstall the data. 27 The defendant went as far to receive confirmation 
from the plaintiffs employee that the data had been backed up.28 The defendant relied 
upon the plaintiffs employees' assertion that the data had been backed up.29 Then the 
defendant over the phone instructed the employee, who had assured the defendant that the 
data was backed up, how to install the program. 30 The program as a possible 
complication of the installation lost all of the dentist's data.31 The plaintiffs employee 
had not backed up the data like he had told the defendant.32 
Ms. Penunuri's facts are considerably more substantial than the facts in Berry, 
which permitted that case to go to trial on gross negligence, and the facts are not remotely 
similar to Blaisdell. Penunuri's facts that establish her claim for gross negligence are 
spelled out in detail in the following section. Even if this Supreme Court of Utah 
determines that the "fixed by law" rule is disjunctive rather then conjunctive, the facts in 
this particular case do not support the summary judgment motion. 
26 See Id at ,rl3. 
21 See Id at ,r 1 s 
28 See Id. 
29 See Id. 
30 See Id at ,r,r3, 15. 
31 See Id at 113 
32 See Id,r,I 15, 4. 
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II. Reasonable Minds Could Determine That RMO Was Grosslv Negligent 
The court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's determination that 
reasonable minds must conclude that there was no gross negligence under the 
circumstances. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.33 An appellate court reviews a lower court's legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views 
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.34 Because negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences 
(j) from the facts, which is properly done by juries rather than judges, summary judgment is 
appropriate in negligence and gross negligence cases only in the clearest instances. 35 
Gross negligence is the failure to observe even slight care; it is carelessness or 
recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences that may 
result.36 
Reasonable minds of a jury could find that facts and all reasonable inferences from 
the facts demonstrate that RMO was grossly negligent. The jury could and since it is 
undisputed will likely find that RMO's guide Ashley Wright had a duty to keep the gaps 
between her guests' horses at less than 32 feet (4 horse lengths) at all times (R. 590, 
1253). The jury could find that at the time the guide came upon a steep incline, a sharp 
33 See Penunuri, 2016 UT 3 at 1 15. See also Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. 
@ 34 See Id. 
35 See Id. 
36 See Id at 116. 
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bend in the trail, and hikers hiding in the brush on the inside of the curve ( the three 
simultaneous dangers on the trial) the standard of care required her to have shrunk the • 
gaps to less than 16 feet (2 horse lengths). The guide could only have done this by 
stopping before passing the dangers to let the horses catch up (R. 947, 949-950). The 
jury could and will likely find that the guide breached her duty to Ms. Penunuri when the 
undisputed facts revealed that she permitted the gaps in the train of horses to grow to 125 
feet, and failed to close the gaps down to 16 feet when she came upon the three additional 
dangers (Id and R. 1261). 
The jury could find that the guide did not show slight care, and that she was 
careless or reckless to a degree that showed utter indifference to the consequences, when @ 
she continued riding on past the three dangers with gaps of 125 feet within her train of 
horses. The guide could be found to not have shown slight care, given the guide had 
yearly training for six years in a row where she was taught and knew that large gaps and 
dangers on the trail will cause horses to suddenly accelerate (R. 898, 1252), yet ignored 
her years of training and passed the three dangers with a 125 foot gap in her train of 
horses. The jury could find that the guide did not show slight care, when the guide 
ignored the pleas of other guest riders who were begging the guide to stop and let the 
trailing riders catch up, especially since she as the leader was the only person capable of 
closing the gaps when she came upon the three dangers (R. 848). Reasonable minds 
could believe Ms. Penunuri's expert that "but for" the gap of 125 feet, a gap greater than 
16 feet, Ms. Penunuri' s horse would not have suddenly accelerated and caused her to be 
thrown off her horse. Lastly, the jury will find that the uncontestable facts reveal that 
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Ms. Penunuri suffered a subluxation fractured neck at C5-C7 and spinal cord syndrom 
from the fall and was life flighted to Utah Regional Medical Center (R. 946, 948-949, 
955). 
The facts to support the gross negligence in this case are as follows: A guide must 
keep gaps in between the horses from 8 to 32 feet and anything beyond 32 feet will likely 
cause a horse to suddenly accelerate to catch up to the heard (R. 590, 1253, 941-942). 
There was a 125-foot gap in Guide Ashley's train of horses when Ms. Penunuri was 
thrown from her horse (R. 597, 1253). Penunuri presented evidence that RMO had a 
safety policy to keep large gaps from forming in the train of horses to protect the riders 
from being thrown off the horses (R. 898, 1252, 1575). 
In particular, RMO's employee manual instructs its guides to: 
[t]ake your responsibility seriously. Guests trust you with their safety and 
often with the safety of their children. They look to you for experience, 
instruction, leadership, and knowledge. They also look to you for fun and 
entertainment. They look to you to make their experience exactly what 
they want it to be -fun, memorable, exciting, and safe. (R. 1252, 1575 p. 
39). 
In regards to keeping the ride safe, RMO's employee manual provided three 
simple safety instructions for the guides: keep gaps from forming; warn of obstacles such 
as hills and hikers; and keep the saddle from slipping, as follows: 
Once on the trail, it is the guide 's responsibility to continually watch over 
and monitor the safety and comfort of his/her guests. 
7. Keep your ride in control. Keep guests in site at all times possible. 
While there are times that they will be unseen constant interaction with 
guests will help keep a controlled environment. 
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8. Adjust vour pace so that large gaps do not form between horses in 
vour string. Gaps encourage horses to trot un-expectedlv. 
9. Advise vour guests of upcoming obstacles that may be difficult or 
intimidating. Teach them what to do and assure them they will be o.k. 
( Up-hills, down hills, tree branch, logs, hikers, etc.) 
10. Continually remind guests of safety issues, re-teaching as you go. 
11. Re-assess the tightness of saddles and remind guests to inform you if 
they feel their saddle slipping from one side to the other. 
12. Constantlv have safety on vour mind! (Emphasis added) 
(R. 898, 1252, 1575 at p. 40,42). 
The length of a horse is seven to eight feet. (R. 1009, 614, 958, 599). Every 
horseperson agreed that gaps should be less than 4 horse lengths or 32 feet, and in 
particular: Joseph Loveridge, the owner of RMO, testified that gaps should be no more 
than two to three horse lengths; Rex Walker, RMO's hired expert, testified that the gap 
should be kept at two to three horse lengths; Bray don Whiteley, a guide for RMO, 
testified that gaps should not extend beyond one to two horse lengths (R. 590, 1253). 
Penunuri's expert, Scott Earl's testimony, gives RMO the largest leeway, that on this ride 
and on this trail, the horses could have a gap of up to four horse lengths, (R. 1256), but Gi 
clarified that when the guide Ashley came upon the three dangers, the steep section of 
trail, sharp curve and the hikers, the gap should not be more than two horse lengths or 16 
feet. (R. 941-942). Specifically Penunuri's expert Scott Earl testified as follows: 
Q. [by Burt Ringwood] And as she bends around the corner, is it a breach in 
the standard of care not to have waited, at that point, to have gotten all of 
those horses back together? 
A. [by Pits' Expert, Mr. Earl] Yes. 
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Q. So at that point, even if they were three or four horse lengths apart, the fact 
of the matter is, she had to get them back to one or two right? 
A. Yes, in my opinion, she should have. 
Q. . .. It's a breach in her duty not to have gotten those back to one and two 
before she came around the danger, before she saw -
A. After seeing the people and knowing there was danger, yes. 
Q. And so she breached her duty, at that point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at that point, she's negligent; is that correct? 
A. That would be correct. (R. 941-942, p.89-90). 
Mr. Earl also testified: 
* * * 
Q. 
A. 
. . . Third, Ashley further breached her duty to keep the riders safe when 
she failed to stop the moment she came around the bend in the trail where 
hikers were waiting in the bushes to let the horses pass. There should be no 
gaps in the horses at any time, but when the horse are coming upon a 
situation that could startle them, extra care should be taken to get the horses 
together before the straggling horses come upon the situation. 
Now, your statement there, that there should be no gaps in the horses 
at any time. That's an impossibility; right? 
No gaps as in, you know, you're going to have gaps. What is meant there, I 
guess it isn't written correctly, large gaps. 
Q. And again, how would you define a large gap? 
A. I would say at this point, you should be one to two horse lengths apart. 
Q. There are other points where it's okay to be further apart? 
A. You should be one to two horse lengths apart at all times, but when you 're 
coming up to a danger, to minimize any risks, make sure you're there. 
24 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. And so you're saying is there should have been extra care to be taken to 
get the horses together before the straggling horses comes upon the 
situation? 
A. That is exactly what I'm saying. (R. 949-950, pp 57-59). 
Mr. Earl also testified that the gaps caused Ms. Penunuri's rented horse to suddenly 
accelerate; that it was the "but for cause": 
Q. . .. And then as I reread [your report], I realized what you are saying is just 
slow the train down and let everybody catch up and then [the hikers can] let 
the horses go by? 
A. See, they can go by people, bridges, water crossings, you're better off to be 
together at a so-called danger. (R. 947, p 68 lines 10-16). 
* * * 
Q. Just for clarification, what do you believe caused Lisa [Penunuri] to fall off 
the horse? 
A. I believe the large gaps, which allowed the horse to accelerate 
unexpectedly, that she lost her seating and fell. (R. 946. P 72 lines 14-18). 
RMO's Guide Braydon Whiteley, is specifically familiar with RMO's horses, and 
testified that with RMO's horses, "three horse lengths is probably a bit too far, three to 
four horse lengths" (R. 644, 632, 1262). Braydon further testified that a gap of three to ~ 
four horse lengths may likely cause RMO's horse to run unexpectedly and a gap of ten 
horse lengths (80 feet) will cause RMO's horses to accelerate unexpectedly (R. 644, 632, 
1262). Joseph Loveridge testified that gaps greater than one to three horse lengths can 
cause a horse to trot unexpectedly, and that when a hiker is on the trail, it is even more 
important to keep the gaps closed (R. 590, 1254). 
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Where Ms. Penunuri landed, she was 102 feet behind Ms. Fort on the trail. (R. 
~ 597, 126l)(Ms. Fort went back to the trail and measured the exact distance). The guide 
Ashley testified that Ms. Penunuri's horse began to accelerate where the hikers were and 
23 feet before she landed on the ground (R. 597, 1261). Therefore, the gap between the 
horses at the time Ms. Penunuri was thrown off was 125 feet (R. 1261 ). Defendants did 
not dispute the distance, rather stating the "exact distance between Ms. Fort's horse and 
[Ms. Penunuri's] horse when she fell, whether it was 102 feet or 125 feet, is immaterial 
@ 
for purposes of this [summary judgment] motion" (R. 1261). Just prior to Ms. Penunuri 
being thrown from her horse, another guest, Suzanne Moag requested that the guide stop 
Ci to close the gaps (R. 848). The guide Ashley testified that she informed the guest that 
instead of stopping, she would continue riding another 100 feet up the trail (R. 614 ). 
The jury could find that the facts support that RMO's guide acted without slight 
care and RMO was grossly negligent when RMO's guide permitted a gap of 125 feet to 
form in her train of horses, and yet continued to travel up the trail after the guide came 
upon three known simultaneous dangers in the trail. With the gap in place, the guide 
continued traveling when she reached a steep section of trail, took a sharp turn, and 
passed hikers waiting in the woods, and when Ms. Penunuri' s horse came upon the three 
additional dangers, her horse suddenly and unexpectedly to her accelerated and threw her 
off because there was a 125 foot gap between her horse and the next. The guide was well 
aware that the combination of dangers and the 125-foot gap would cause Ms. Penunuri's 
horse to accelerate unexpectedly to Ms. Penunuri. 
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Slight care: 
As it stands today, under the court of appeals' analysis in Penunuri, a defendant 
merely has to demonstrate that it showed slight care at sometime in the relationship 
between the defendant and the plaintiff that is unrelated to the actual negligence, or that it 
intended another result (i.e. pony up the horse) to avoid liability for its gross 
negligence.37 If permitted to stand, then gross negligence would be impossible to 
establish regardless of the situation. 38 This is contrary to the Supreme Court of Utah's 
findings in Berry. In Berry, the defendant alleged it had shown slight care, by requiring 
the skiers to wear helmets, using blue paint to mark takeoff points of the jumps, had 
speed gates and berms to slow down the racers, and safety barriers. 39 The plaintiff was 
required to "slip" the course twice to familiarize himself with the course.40 Even though 
these facts were somewhat related to the negligent act, none of these facts were relevant 
to the Supreme Court's analysis since there was no applicable standard of care to ground 
the analysis.41 
In this present appeal, the court of appeals determined that "the guide did observe, 
at the very least, slight care: she gave Penunuri instructions on how to mount the horse 
and how to stop the horse from grazing, she had been "slowing down the whole ride"42 
37 See Id at ,I 28 
38 A drunk driver involved in an accident could escape gross negligence just by showing 
that he was following the speed limit. 
39 See Berry, 2007 UT 87 at ,4. 
40 See Id 
41 See Id at ,I30. @ 
42 The statement that the guide was "slowing down the whole ride" was never made in 
RMO's opening memorandum, but was only presented in RMO's reply in response to a 
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for Penunuri and Child and she planned to take the reins of Child's horse once the riders 
<i reached a suitable area to rearrange the order of the riders. "43 These moments of slight 
care have nothing to do with the moment when the guide Ashley committed the gross 
negligence. The guide Ashley did not show slight care and acted with utter indifference 
when she simultaneously climbed a steep section of trail, rounded a sharp tum, and 
passed hikers hiding in the bushes on the inside of the tum ("three dangers") and yet 
continued on up the trail. The guide did not stop and close the 125-foot gap but she 
continued with utter indifference to the consequences of the gaps while ignoring the pleas 
of the fellow guests to stop to let Ms. Penunuri catch up. When the guide came upon the 
(i three dangers the 125-foot gap was already present. Whether or not Ms. Penunuri knew 
how to mount the horse, learned how to stop the horse from grazing, or if the guide was 
slowing down or that she intended to pony up the child, does not show the guide 
exhibited slight care at the moment of the negligence, when the guide came upon the 
three dangers and did not stop with a 125-foot gap in the train of horses. The guide was 
the only person who could have closed the gaps before Ms. Penunuri' s horse came upon 
the same three dangers with a 125-foot gap in front of her horse. 
fact that Ms. Penunuri made in her opposition to the MSJ in the trial court. It was never 
argued or brought up during oral argument and, other than as a response to one of 
~ plaintiffs undisputed facts, it was never presented in the body of the Reply's argument 
section. It should have never made its way as an undisputed fact as found by the trial 
court, and it certainly does not negate the fact that there was a 125 foot gap at the time the 
guide passed three dangers and she was at that moment required to stop the train of 
horses and close the gap (R. 1259-1260). This statement is contrary to the guide's own 
testimony that Ms. Penunuri was moving. (R. 614) It also makes little sense, the trip was 
® a two hour ride, they were well past half way and a rider can only slow a horse down so 
much, before it would come to a stop. 
43 See Penunuri, 2016 UT App. 154 at 128. 
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For example, an analogy in medicine would be a surgeon who has a patient 
present with signs of liver malfunction. The surgeon performs a CT scan that shows a ct 
tumor on the liver. The standard of care before performing the surgery is to perform a CT 
scan, nonetheless the surgeon goes beyond what is required and also performs an MRI. 
The surgeon meets with the patient fifteen to twenty times to make sure that surgery is 
the right option. The surgeon talks at length with the patient and family and in great 
detail explains the procedure and the potential complications. He explains that without 
the surgery the patient would die from the tumor within 20 to 30 years. Ultimately the 
surgeon, the patient, and family elect to go forward with the surgery. The surgeon acted 
at least with slight care up to this point. ~ 
The surgeon performs the surgery and leaves a scalpel in the patient. Immediately 
after the surgery he recognizes that he left the scalpel in the patient. He has an 
opportunity to stop what he is doing at that moment and reopen the patient and 
immediately retrieve the scalpel. He knows that if he does the patient will live but if he 
leaves the scalpel it will soon kill the patient. Nonetheless, he decides that he will wait 
until morning to remove the scalpel. As expected the patient dies in the night. Because 
of Penunuri, the patient's family does not get the gross negligence in front of the jury. 
Pursuant to Penunuri v. Sundance Partners LTD,44 that surgeon could not be sued 
for gross negligence because, like in Penunuri, he showed slight care before he started 
the surgery and before he was grossly negligent, even though the patient, like in 
Penununri, had no control over the negligent act or in this instance at the moment the 
44 2016 UT App. 154, 380 p.3d 3 (2016) 
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surgeon chose to leave the scalpel. Additionally, the surgeon could not be held for gross 
~ negligence because, like in Penunuri, he did not intend to harm or kill the patient but 
intended a different outcome. Like in Penunuri, he intended to correct the problem later, 
he intended to go in after the scalpel the following day just as the guide intended to pony 
up the child later. Pursuant to Penunuri, the trial court would have to dismiss the gross 
negligence claims, because at some time when the surgeon was taking care of the patient 
he showed slight care or intended slight care, even though the slight care was unrelated to 
the negligence. Slight care has to be somehow connected to the moment of negligence. 
III. The Court of Appeals Erred in Affirming the District Court's Award of 
Deposition Costs to RMO. 
The court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's award of deposition 
costs to RMO. Costs were not recoverable at common law; and are therefore generally 
allowable only in the amounts and in the manner provided by statute. 45 The trial court has 
a duty to guard against excesses or abuses in the taxing of costs.46 The Frampton court 
recognized that taxing the expenses of depositions has "been a matter of some 
® controversy in this jurisdiction."47 To award deposition costs, "the district court 'must 
find that the depositions were essential because they were used in a meaningful wav at 
trial, or because the development of the case was of such a complex nature that the 
~ 45 See Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1980). 
46 See Id at 774. 
47 See Id. 
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information in the deposition could not be obtained through less expensive means of 
discovery."'48 In Young v. State, the Supreme Court ruled, 
to be taxable as costs, depositions need not be used at trial, provided other 
criteria are met. In applying the general rule in Board Commissioners of 
the Utah State Bar, we stated, 'This is not to say that the costs of taking a 
deposition can never be recovered when the deposition is not used at trial. 
We have stated that 'we would allow deposition costs as necessary and 
reasonable where the development of the case is such a complex nature that 
discovery cannot be accomplished through less expensive methods of 
interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for the production of 
documents. ' 49 
This case did not go to trial, it was decided on a motion for summary judgment. Without 
a statute to give costs for depositions used in summary dispositions, the trial court was 
required to find that "the development of the case was of such a complex nature that the Ci 
information in the deposition could not be obtained through less expensive means of 
discovery. "50 
In fact, the court of appeals addressed this issue and recognized "the district court 
did not decide that the depositions were essential 'because the development of the case 
was of such a complex nature that the information in the depositions could not be 
obtained through less expensive means of discovery.' In fact, the court stated 'I haven't 
really reached a conclusion as to whether or not this case was of such a complex nature 
that . . . less expensive discovery could have been obtain. "51 Therefore, since there was 
no trial, the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's award of costs 
48 See Penunuri, 2016 UT App. 154, at iJ 37, quoting Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, ,II I 16 
P.3d 549. 
49 See Young, 2000 UT 91 at iJ7. 
50 See Id. 
51 See Penunuri, 2016 UT App. 154 at iJ38. 
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without a finding from a trial court that the discovery could not be obtained by a less 
@ expensive means of discovery. 
The trial court erred when it determined that RMO was entitled to the deposition 
costs in the amount of $2,577.32, together with post judgment interests, when the same 
evidence could have been obtained through less expensive means. U.R.C.P. Rule 54(d) 
governs costs. The relevant portion of Rule 54 provides:" 
The party who claims costs. . . [must] file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiants knowledge . . . 
the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the proceeding. 52 
The Supreme Court of Utah determined that a party: 
seeking costs must show the depositions were so essential to the case that 
the information provided by the deposition could not have been obtained 
through less expensive means of discovery. 53 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that there is a distinction to be 
understood between legitimate and taxable costs and other expenses of 
litigation which may ever be so necessary, but are not taxable costs. 54 
Costs are only those that are absolutely necessary. 55 RMO contended they needed Ms. 
Penunuri's deposition as it was: 
used in summary judgment briefs to establish that she had been presented 
with and signed the Horseback Riding Release which warned her of the 
"Inherent Risks" associated with horseback riding; and that she was not 
confused by or sought any clarification concerning the language of the 
Horseback Riding Release; that she was of legal age and capacity to 
execute the Horseback Riding Release. Ms. Penunuri's deposition was also 
used to establish her version of the facts leading up to and including her fall 
from the horse. (R. at 1444). 
52 See Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 54(b) 
53 See Jensen v. Sawyer, 2005 UT 81, at ,r139, 
54 Id at ,r141, FN 14 
55 Id at ,r130. 
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These facts from Ms. Penunuri could have been obtained through interrogatories and the 
deposition was therefore not essential. 
that: 
Kate Fort was a rider on the trail and the mother of Haley Fort; RMO contended 
Ms. Fort's deposition testimony was used in the parties' summary judgment 
briefing to establish the events leading up to the accident, the instructions 
that were given to participants during the ride and facts leading up to Ms. 
Penunuri' s fall. (R. at 1443) 
In regards to Suzanne Moag, RMO claims: 
Ms. Moag' s deposition testimony was used in the parties' summary 
judgment briefing to establish that instructions had been given to 
participants on the ride and that RMO's guide Ashley Wright, had informed 
the participants that after the group reached a clearing, she would go back 
to pony Haley Fort's horse the remainder of the ride to help keep the group 
together and to prevent it from stopping to graze. (R. at 1443) 
RMO obtained most of these facts shortly after Ms. Penunuri was thrown from the horse 
from statements attached to the incident report. Ms. Fort and Ms. Moag voluntarily filled 
out an incident form provided to them by RMO. There was no reason that RMO could 
not have created a declaration or affidavit having the same effect as a deposition or ® 
interrogatories to Ms. Penunuri. 
* * * 
* * * 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Penunuri respectfully request that this Supreme 
Court of Utah find in her favor and reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case for 
trial. Ms. Penunuri also requests that this Supreme Court reverse the costs awarded to 
RMO. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of December 2016. 
STRIEPER LAW FIRM 
sis Robert Strieper 
ROBERT D. STRIEPER 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellants 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annas) 
Part VII. Judgment 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54 
RULE 54. JUDGMENTS; COSTS 
Currentness 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree or order that adjudicates all claims and the rights 
and liabilities of all parties or any other order from which an appeal of right lies. A judgment should not contain a recital 
of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When an action presents more than one claim for 
relief--whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim--and/or when multiple parties are involved, 
the court may enter judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only if the court expressly 
determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as 
@ to any of the claims or parties, and may be changed at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims 
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in 
the pleadings. Every other judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not 
~ demanded that relief in its pleadings. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(l) To whom awarded. Unless a statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs should be allowed to the 
@ prevailing party. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies may be imposed only to the extent permitted 
by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed The party who claims costs must not later than 14 days after the entry of judgment file and serve 
a verified memorandum of costs. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within 7 days after service of the 
@ memorandum of costs, object to the claimed costs. 
( d)(3) Memorandum filed before judgment. A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of 
or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, 
is deemed served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(e) Amending the judgment to add costs or attorney fees. If the court awards costs under paragraph (d) or attorney fees 
under Rule 73 after the judgment is entered, the prevailing party must file and serve an amended judgment including 
11 I , •~ • , JI I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the costs or attorney fees. The court will enter the amended judgment unless another party objects within 7 days after 
the amended judgment is filed. 
Credits 
[Amended effective January 1, 1985; November 1, 2003; November 1, 2011; May 1, 2014; November 1, 2015; November <i 
1, 2016.] 
Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 54, UT R RCP Rule 54 
Current with amendments received through September 15, 2016. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
Part VII. Judgment 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Currentness 
(a) Motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment. A party may move for summary judgment, identifying 
each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or defense--on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant 
summary judgment if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying 
the motion. The motion and memoranda must follow Rule 7 as supplemented below. 
(a)(l) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a motion for summary judgment must contain a statement of 
material facts claimed not to be genuinely disputed. Each fact must be separately stated in numbered paragraphs and 
supported by citing to materials in the record under paragraph (c)(l) of this rule. 
(a}(2) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a memorandum opposing the motion must include a verbatim 
restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is disputed with an explanation of the grounds for the dispute 
supported by citing to materials in the record under paragraph (c)(l) of this rule. The memorandum may contain a 
separate statement of additional materials facts in dispute, which must be separately stated in numbered paragraphs and 
@ similarly supported. 
(a}(3) The motion and the memorandum opposing the motion may contain a concise statement of facts, whether disputed 
or undisputed, for the limited purpose of providing background and context for the case, dispute and motion. 
(a)(4) Each material fact set forth in the motion or in the memorandum opposing the motion under paragraphs (a)(l) 
and (a)(2) that is not disputed is deemed admitted for the purposes of the motion. 
(b) Time to file a motion. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may move for summary judgment at any time after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party or after 21 days from the commencement of the action. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may move for summary judgment at any time. Unless the court 
orders otherwise, a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time no later than 28 days after the close of 
all discovery. 
(c) Procedures. 
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(c)(l) Supporting factual positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed or is genuinely disputed 
must support the assertion by: 
(c)(l)(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored ~ 
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, 
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or 
(c)(l)(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute. 
(c)(2) Objection that a fact is not supported by admissible evidence. A party may object that the material cited to support 
or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence. 
(c)(3) Materials not cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the 
record. 
( c)( 4) Affidavits or declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal 
knowledge, must set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and must show that the affiant or declarant is 
competent to testify on the matters stated. 
(d) When facts are unavailable to the nonmoving party. If a nonmoving party shows by affidavit or declaration that, for 
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: 
( d)( 1) defer considering the motion or deny it without prejudice; 
(d)(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or 
(d)(3) issue any other appropriate order. 
(e) Failing to properly support or address a fact. If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly 
address another party's assertion of fact as required by paragraph (c), the court may: 
(e)(l) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; 
(e)(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; 
(e)(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials--including the facts considered undisputed--show 
that the moving party is entitled to it; or 
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(e)(4) issue any other appropriate order. 
(t) Judgment independent of the motion. After giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the court may: 
(f)(l) grant summary judgment for a nonmoving party; 
(f)(2) grant the motion on grounds not raised by a party; or 
(f)(3) consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely 
in dispute. 
(g) Failing to grant all the requested relief. If the court does not grant all the relief requested by the motion, it may enter 
(j) an order stating any material fact--including an item of damages or other relief--that is not genuinely in dispute and 
treating the fact as established in the case. 
(h) Affidavit or declaration submitted in bad faith. If satisfied that an affidavit or declaration under this rule is submitted 
in bad faith or solely for delay, the court--after notice and a reasonable time to respond--may order the submitting party 
~ to pay the other party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, it incurred as a result. The court may also hold 
an off ending party or attorney in contempt or order other appropriate sanctions. 
Credits 
[Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004; May 1, 2014. Repealed and re-enacted effective November 
@ 1, 2015.] 
Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 56, UT R RCP Rule 56 
Current with amendments received through September 15, 2016. 
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(j Penunuri v. Sundance Partners Ltd., 380 P.3d 3 (2016) 
2016 UT App 154 
380 P.3d 3 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Lisa Penunuri and Barry Siegwart, Appellants, 
V. 
Sundance Partners Ltd., Sundance Holdings 
LLC, Sundance Development Corporation, 
Robert Redford, Redford 1970 Trust, and 
Rocky Mountain Outfitters LC, Appellees. 
Synopsis 
No. 20140854-CA 
I 
Filed July 21, 2016 
Background: Participant in guided horseback ride brought 
action against operator for gross negligence for guide's 
conduct, alleging participant fell from horse when horse 
suddenly accelerated to catch up with group after it 
had been grazing. The Fourth District Court, Provo 
Department, Claudia Laycock, J., entered summary 
judgment in favor of operator. Participant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, J. Frederic Voros, J., held 
that: 
[I] guide did not fail to observe even slight care or act with 
utter indifference, as required to establish gross negligence 
claim, and 
[2] award of $2,577.32 in deposition costs to operator was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes (9) 
11 I Judgment 
Tort cases in general 
Because negligence cases often require the 
drawing of inferences from the facts, which 
is properly done by juries rather than 
judges, summary judgment is appropriate in 
(2) 
(3) 
(41 
(5) 
negligence cases only in the clearest instances. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Negligence 
. " Gross negligence 
"Gross negligence" is the failure to observe 
even slight care; it is carelessness or 
recklessness to a degree that shows utter 
indifference to the consequences that may 
result. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Negligence 
··· Gross negligence 
Gross negligence, which is associated with 
willful, wanton, and reckless conduct, applies 
to conduct that is so far from a proper 
state of mind that it is treated in many 
respects as if harm was intended and usually 
is accompanied by a conscious indifference to 
consequences. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Animals 
·· Horses and other equines 
Guide who led horseback ride did not fail 
to observe even slight care or act with utter 
indifference, as required to establish gross 
negligence claim brought by participant in 
guided horseback ride alleging that she fell 
from horse when it suddenly accelerated to 
catch up with group after it had been grazing, 
where guide gave instructions to participant 
on how to mount horse and how to stop horse 
from grazing, guide slowed down the whole 
ride for participant and a child participant, 
whose horse had been grazing too, and guide 
planned to take reins of child's horse once 
participants reached a suitable area to do so. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Negligence 
Gross negligence 
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2016 UT App 154 
(6) 
17) 
(8] 
Gross negligence requires proof of conduct 
substantially more distant from the 
appropriate standard of care than does 
ordinary negligence. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Costs 
. •· Depositions and affidavits 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion m 
awarding deposition costs in the amount 
of $2,577.32 to horseback riding operator 
for depositions of participants in guided 
horseback ride, after granting summary 
judgment in favor of operator in gross 
negligence action alleging that participant fell 
from horse when horse suddenly accelerated 
to catch up with group after it had 
been grazing, where court found that 
depositions were used in a meaningful way 
in establishing undisputed facts for purposes 
of operator's summary judgment motion, 
that depositions were required to obtain 
participants' testimony, and that depositions 
were taken in good faith and appeared to 
have been essential for development and 
presentation of case. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l), 
56(a). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Appeal and Error 
- Review of Specific Questions and 
Particular Decisions 
In reviewing a district court's denial or award 
of costs, the Court of Appeals applies a highly 
deferential standard. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Costs 
. -·· Depositions and affidavits 
The general rule regarding the recovery of 
deposition costs is that a party may recover 
deposition costs as long as the trial court 
is persuaded that the depositions were taken 
in good faith and, in the light of the 
circumstances, appeared to be essential for 
(9) 
the development and presentation of the case. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Costs 
.. Depositions and affidavits 
In awarding deposition costs, the district court 
must find that the depositions were essential 
because they were used in a meaningful way 
at trial, or because the development of the 
case was of such a complex nature that the 
information in the depositions could not be 
obtained through less expensive means of 
discovery. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
*4 Fourth District Court, Provo Department, The 
Honorable Claudia Laycock, No. 080400019 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
Robert D. Strieper, Salt Lake City, Attorney for 
Appellants. 
H. Burt Ringwood, Sandy and A. Joseph Sano, Salt Lake 
City, Attorneys for Appellees. 
Judge J. Frederic Voros Jr. authored this Opinion, in 
which Judge Michele M. Christiansen and Senior Judge 
Russell W. Bench concurred. 1 
Opinion 
VOROS, Judge: 
*5 11 Plaintiffs Lisa Penunuri and Barry Siegwart 
appeal the district court's entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Rocky Mountain Outfitters LC and the other 
defendants (collectively, Rocky Mountain). Penunuri 
suffered injuries when she fell from her horse on a 
guided trail ride. On that ride, potentially dangerous gaps 
formed between horses. Rather than addressing these gaps 
immediately, the trail guide decided to deal with them 
after the company had passed some hikers and reached a 
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clearing. But before they did, Penunuri fell off her horse. 
Plaintiffs sued Rocky Mountain and related parties for 
ordinary negligence and gross negligence. 
,2 The district court ruled that a release signed by 
Penunuri barred the ordinary negligence claim. This court 
and the Utah Supreme Court upheld that ruling in a prior 
appeal. On remand, the district court rejected the gross 
negligence claim on summary judgment. We agree with the 
district court that this set of facts cannot as a matter of 
law support a claim of gross negligence. Accordingly, we 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 2 
13 On August 1, 2007, Penunurijoined a guided horseback 
trail ride operated by Rocky Mountain at Sundance 
Resort. Her group consisted of a guide and four other 
riders: Penunuri's two friends, an eight-year-old child 
(Child), and Child's mother (Mother). Before beginning 
the ride, Penunuri and the other riders received instruction 
from the guide and signed liability releases. The guide 
worked as a horseback trail guide for Rocky Mountain 
from summer 2004 to fall 2008. She was trained by 
Rocky Mountain at the beginning of each season to guide 
horseback trail rides. Rocky Mountain instructed guides 
to close up large gaps between horses as they walked and 
to warn riders about hazards on the trail. 
14 The riders left the stables riding single file. Throughout 
the ride, the guide rode at the head of the group. For 
the first 45 minutes, Mother, Child, and Penunuri were 
the first three riders, followed by Penunuri's friends. After 
stopping at a meadow, the order of the riders changed. 
Penunuri's friends rode behind the guide, while Mother, 
Child, and Penunuri brought up the rear. Both Child 
and Penunuri struggled to keep their horses from grazing. 
The grazing caused Child's and Penunuri's horses to lag 
behind, creating gaps between the horses. 
,5 The guide tried to keep the group together by slowing 
down. One of Penunuri's friends asked the guide to stop 
and wait for Child and Penunuri to catch up. The guide 
responded that they would be stopping at a clearing about 
100 feet away so that she could take the reins of Child's 
horse. To reach the clearing, the horses had to climb a 
steep section of the trail around a bend where hikers were 
present. Child's horse again stopped to graze, creating a 
w, ).'11 /·,\'.1 
gap of several feet between Penunuri and the rest of the 
group. When Child's and Penunuri's horses began moving 
again, Penunuri testified that "it was a rougher ride than 
[she] remember[ed] having had before." She testified that 
"with other grazing episodes my horse would, you know, 
kind of giddyup a little faster than it had been going, 
because [Child's] horse would start up and then mine 
would start up, too, and then would slow down. And 
this particular incident, it seemed even rougher than, you 
know, the giddyup that I had gotten in other stops." Her 
horse suddenly accelerated and Penunuri fell off, suffering 
injuries. 
,6 Plaintiffs sued Rocky Mountain alleging ordinary 
negligence, gross negligence, and vicarious liability. 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
and declaratory relief. They argued that a release Penunuri 
had signed was unenforceable under the Limitations on 
Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act. The 
district court concluded that the Act did not prevent 
a party from contracting away its liability for ordinary 
*6 negligence. The court accordingly ruled the release 
enforceable and dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims based 
on ordinary negligence. This court and the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the district court's ruling. See Penunuri 
v. Sundance Partners, Ltd, 2013 UT 22, 301 P.3d 984; 
Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd, 2011 UT App 183, 
257 P.3d 1049. 
,1 On remand, Plaintiffs pursued their gross negligence 
claim. Rocky Mountain filed two motions for summary 
judgment, the first to dismiss Plaintiffs' gross negligence 
claim and the second, in the alternative, to exclude 
Plaintiffs' proposed expert witness. The court granted 
both motions, dismissing the gross negligence claim 
and ruling that Plaintiffs' proposed expert was "not 
qualified to render expert opinion testimony concerning 
the standard of care applicable to commercial horseback 
trail guiding." The court also awarded Rocky Mountain 
costs pursuant to rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Plaintiffs appeal. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
,s First, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred 
when it granted summary judgment to Rocky Mountain 
in a gross negligence case where the standard of care was 
not fixed by law. 
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19 Second, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred 
when it determined that no facts supported their claims of 
gross negligence. 
110 Third, Plaintiffs contend that the district court "erred 
when it determined the outcome of the entire case based 
upon one alleged, disputable fact." 
111 Fourth, Plaintiffs contend that the district court 
erred when it "granted (Rocky Mountain's] motion 
for summary judgment on causation based upon 
mischaracterization of deposition testimony." 
,I12 Fifth, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred 
when it granted Rocky Mountain's alternative motion 
for summary judgment and excluded testimony from 
Plaintiffs' proposed expert witness. Because our resolution 
of Plaintiffs' first four claims on appeal renders this claim 
moot, we do not consider its merits. 
,I13 Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the district court 
abused its discretion when it awarded Rocky Mountain 
costs. 
ANALYSIS 
I. The District Court Properly Granted 
Rocky Mountain's Summary Judgment 
Motion Relating to Gross Negligence. 
,Il4 Plaintiffs' first four contentions each challenge the 
district court's granting of Rocky Mountain's first motion 
for summary judgment. The district court granted the 
motion on the ground that Plaintiffs "presented no 
evidence upon which reasonable minds could conclude 
that [Rocky Mountain's] guide ... exercised no care." 
(1) ,II 5 Summary judgment is appropriate "if the moving 
party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). "An 
appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions 
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment 
for correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,r 
6, 177 P.3d 600 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). "[B]ecause negligence cases often require the 
drawing of inferences from the facts, which is properly 
done by juries rather than judges, summary judgment 
is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest 
instances." Castellanos v. Tommy John, LLC, 2014 UT 
App 48, ,r 7, 321 P.3d 218 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
(2) (3) 116 "Gross negligence is 'the failure to observe 
even slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness to a 
degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences 
that may result.' "Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found, 2008 
UT 13, ,124, 179 P.3d 760 (quoting Berry v. Greater Park 
City Co., 2007 UT 87, ,r 26, 171 P.3d 442). Further, "gross 
negligence, which is associated with willful, wanton, and 
reckless conduct, applies to conduct that is so far from a 
proper state of mind *7 that it is treated in many respects 
as if harm was intended and usually is accompanied by 
a conscious indifference to consequences." Blaisdell v. 
Dentrix Dental Sys., Inc., 2012 UT 37, ,r 16,284 P.3d 616 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
,117 First, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred 
when it granted summary judgment to Rocky Mountain 
in a gross negligence case where the standard of care 
was not fixed by law. They argue that the "standard 
of care regarding how a guide manages gaps in the 
train of horses is not fixed by law" and that it was 
therefore "inappropriate for the [district] court to grant 
the summary judgment motion." 
118 Plaintiffs rely on the Utah Supreme Court's opinions 
in Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, 171 P .3d 
442, and Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation, 2008 UT 13, 
179 P.3d 760. The Berry court stated a two-part guideline 
for summary judgment in negligence cases: 
[S]ummary judgment is " 'inappropriate unless the 
applicable standard of care is fixed by law, and 
reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to 
the defendant's negligence under the circumstances.' " 
Berry, 2007 UT 87, ,r 27, 171 P.3d 442 (quoting White 
v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994) (quoting 
Wyca/is v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821,825 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989))). Plaintiffs read this passage to mean that 
summary judgment may never be granted in negligence 
cases unless both the standard of care is "fixed by law" 
and reasonable minds could not differ as to the defendant's 
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negligence. And to be sure, the passage does describe the 
two elements in the conjunctive. 
119 But that is not how our supreme court has 
read Berry. Utah courts grant summary judgment with 
some frequency in negligence cases-usually against the 
plaintiff-where the standard of care is not "fixed by 
law" in the sense that the defendant violated a statute or 
precedent specific to the industry or practice at issue. And 
our supreme court, citing Berry, did that very thing in 
Blaisdell v. Dentrix Dental Systems, Inc., 2012 UT 37,284 
P.3d 616. 
120 In Blaisdell, a dentist sued a software provider for 
gross negligence. Id. ,r 2. The court affirmed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant. The plaintiff argued on appeal, quoting Berry, 
that "summary judgment is inappropriate on the issue of 
gross negligence unless there is a 'standard of care ... fixed 
by law.' " Id. 1 14 (quoting Berry, 2007 UT 87, ,r 30, 
171 P.3d 442). But the court, also citing Berry, disposed 
of the claim under the rule that summary judgment "is 
generally inappropriate to resolve negligence claims and 
should be employed only in the most clear-cut case." Id 1 
15 (quoting Berry, 2007 UT 87, ,r 27, 171 P.3d 442). And 
despite the absence of any law fixing the standard of care 
for providers of dental practice management software, the 
supreme court affirmed on the ground that reasonable 
minds could not differ as to whether the defendant's 
conduct in that case was grossly negligent (it wasn't). Id. ,r 
16. In other words, the supreme court read the Berry test as 
if the two factors were disjunctive rather than conjunctive 
elements. 
121 We conclude that the supreme court's application of 
the two-part test in Blaisdell represents the original and 
best reading of that test. The two-part test came to Utah 
via Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Wyca/is stated the test this way: 
Accordingly, summary judgment is 
inappropriate unless the applicable 
standard of care is "fixed by 
law," and reasonable minds could 
reach but one conclusion as to 
the defendant's negligence under the 
circumstances. 
Id. at 825 (quoting Elmer v. Vanderford, 74 Wash.2d 546, 
445 P.2d 612, 614 (1968)). But Elmer v. Vande,ford, the 
w,).-,11•.w 
source of the "fixed by law" formulation, states the test 
in the disjunctive. It identifies "two classes of cases in 
which the question of negligence may be determined by 
the court as a conclusion of law." Elmer, 445 P.2d at 
614 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In 
the first class of cases, "the standard of duty is fixed, 
and the measure of duty defined, by law, and is the 
same under all circumstances." Id (citation and internal 
quotation *8 marks omitted). In the second, "the facts 
are undisputed and but one reasonable inference can be 
drawn from them." Id. (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). In effect, this is an alternative formulation 
of our rule 56. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
,r22 Thus, both as originally promulgated and as actually 
employed by our supreme court, under the fixed-by-
law formulation a district court must grant summary 
judgment if, based on undisputed facts and under the 
governing legal standard, reasonable minds could not 
differ as to whether the defendant acted negligently. In any 
event, we look to the governing standard in rule 56: "The 
court shall grant summary judgment if the moving party 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Id. And that is the case here. 
,r23 Consequently, we hold that Berry did not require 
the district court to deny Rocky Mountain's summary 
judgment motion on the ground that the standard of care 
governing "how a guide manages gaps in the train of 
horses" on commercial trail rides is not fixed by law. The 
district court handled the gross negligence claim here just 
as the supreme court handled the gross negligence claim 
in Blaisdell. 
(4] ,I24 Second, Plaintiffs contend that the district court 
"erred when it determined there were no facts to support 
[Plaintiffs'] gross negligence claim." Specifically, Plaintiffs 
argue that the court "chose to ignore [Rocky Mountain's] 
employee manual," which instructed its guides to "keep 
gaps from forming, warn of obstacles such as hills and 
hikers, and keep the saddle from slipping." 
125 The district court ruled that Plaintiffs "presented no 
evidence upon which reasonable minds could conclude 
that [Rocky Mountain's] guide ... exercised no care." It 
further ruled that Plaintiffs did not present "any evidence 
to show that [the guide] knew or had reason to know of 
facts that would have created a high risk of physical harm 
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to ... Penunuri, but deliberately proceeded to act, or failed 
to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that 
risk." And, the court concluded, without any evidence 
of the guide's gross negligence-in other words, without 
any evidence that she acted with "utter indifference" to 
Penunuri's safety during the horseback ride-"reasonable 
minds could reach but one conclusion": that the guide was 
not grossly negligent. See Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 
2008 UT 13, 1 24, 179 P.3d 760 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
(5) 126 As previously explained, "[g]ross negligence 
requires proof of conduct substantially more distant from 
the appropriate standard of care than does ordinary 
negligence." Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 
87, 1 26, 171 P.3d 442. It "is 'the failure to observe 
even slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness to a 
degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences 
that may result.' " Pearce, 2008 UT 13, 1 24, 179 
P.3d 760 (quoting Berry, 2007 UT 87, 1 26, 171 P.3d 
442). Therefore, for Plaintiffs' claim to survive Rocky 
Mountain's summary judgment motion, the facts had to 
be capable of supporting a finding that Rocky Mountain's 
guide failed "to observe even slight care" and acted with 
"utter indifference to the consequences that may result." 
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
127 Plaintiffs argue that Rocky Mountain's employee 
manual's warning about gaps as well as testimony from 
Rocky Mountain employees about the potential problems 
when gaps form "should have created a rebuttable 
presumption of negligence." Plaintiffs do not support 
this argument with legal authority stating that internal 
training manuals may define a standard of care. 3 But 
even if that assertion were true, it is not relevant. Plaintiffs 
cannot succeed by showing that the evidence would 
support a finding of ordinary negligence; their claim alleges 
gross negligence. And even they do not contend that the 
manual demonstrates that the guide exercised no care and 
acted with utter indifference to the consequences of her 
actions. 
128 Furthermore, we agree with the district court that, 
even resolving all inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, the 
evidence could not support a finding of gross negligence. 
On the *9 contrary, the facts indisputably show that the 
guide did observe, at the very least, slight care: she gave 
Penunuri instructions on how to mount the horse and how 
to stop the horse from grazing, she had been "slowing 
down the whole ride" for Penunuri and Child, and she 
planned to take the reins of Child's horse once the riders 
reached a suitable area to rearrange the order of the riders. 
In addition, Plaintiffs' own proposed expert "testified that 
there is no evidence in this case indicating that [Rocky 
Mountain's] guide ... exercised no care or acted in willful 
disregard for the care of others." 4 In sum, the undisputed 
evidence before the court could not sustain a jury finding 
of gross negligence. 
129 Third, Plaintiffs contend that the district court "erred 
when it determined the outcome of the entire case based 
upon one alleged, disputable fact." Plaintiffs argue that 
the district court granted Rocky Mountain's motion for 
summary judgment based on the "guide's testimony that 
she was slowing down the entire ride." Plaintiffs further 
argue that the guide's "failure to stop the moment she 
came upon the hikers to close the gaps that had formed" 
breached the standard of care. 
130 We do not read the district court's ruling so narrowly. 
True, the court prominently cited the guide's testimony 
that she "had been slowing down the whole ride." But the 
court also cited the fact that the guide "was attempting 
to get the group to a larger clearing" to take the reins of 
Child's horse, as well as Plaintiffs' own proposed expert's 
testimony that the guide had not "exercised no care." 
131 Moreover, we agree with the district court's 
characterization of the guide's testimony as undisputed. 
The guide testified, "I had been slowing down the 
whole ride." Plaintiffs argue that this testimony "is fully 
contradicted by the facts that the trial court disregarded." 
Plaintiffs refer to testimony that the guide "just march[ed] 
on at a normal speed" and did not stop when requested. 
But the page of the record Plaintiffs cite in support of 
this assertion does not support it. The witness testified as 
follows: "I told [the guide] that we had to wait up, to stop. 
And she said that we would stop at the clearing farther 
on and that she would pony [Child] in." This testimony 
does not contradict the guide's testimony that she had been 
slowing down the whole ride. Accordingly, the court's 
summary judgment does not rest on a single disputed fact. 
,I32 In addition, Plaintiffs cite other testimony from which 
they allege that a finder of fact could conclude that the 
guide knew the potential danger of gaps between horses, 
knew that gaps had formed in this company, and decided 
to close those gaps only after the group got past the foot 
@ 
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traffic and bends in the trail. But, as explained above, 
this testimony would at most support a claim for ordinary 
negligence. Even assuming the truth of all the evidence on 
which Plaintiffs rely, it does not support a claim of gross 
negligence. 
i!33 Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the district court 
"erred when it granted [Rocky Mountain's] motion 
for summary judgment on causation based upon 
mischaracterization of deposition testimony." Plaintiffs' 
proposed expert testified that "several things could have 
startled that horse and caused it to start running"; he 
also testified that if there had not been a gap between the 
horses, "all of those causes could have been minimalized." 
He testified that "there should have been extra care taken 
to get the horses together." The court ruled that summary 
judgment was appropriate because Plaintiffs "presented 
no evidence beyond speculation concerning causation." 
'jj34 Plaintiffs argue that the court ignored the expert's 
testimony that the danger could have been lessened or 
eliminated if the gaps had been closed between the horses. 
We do not agree with Plaintiffs' characterization of the 
district court's assessment of the causation evidence. But 
even if the district court erroneously concluded that the 
evidence could not support a finding of causation, the 
outcome of this case would be the same, because, as 
explained above, we agree with *10 the district court that 
evidence of gross negligence is lacking here. 
'jj35 For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err 
in granting Rocky Mountain's summary judgment motion 
on the gross negligence claim. And because we conclude 
that the undisputed facts support summary judgment 
for Rocky Mountain even assuming the admissibility of 
the testimony of Plaintiffs' proposed expert, we need 
not address Plaintiffs' challenge to the district court's 
exclusion of that witness. 
II. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
When It Awarded Deposition Costs to Rocky Mountain. 
of costs, we apply a highly deferential standard." Giusti 
v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, 'ii 84, 201 P.3d 
966. In Giusti, the supreme court concluded that because 
the trial court "applied the correct standard" and "gave 
a legitimate reason for its decision," it "did not abuse its 
discretion." Id. 'ii 86. 
18) 19) 'jj37 Under rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, "[u]nless a statute, these rules, or a 
court provides otherwise, costs should be allowed to the 
prevailing party." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l). "The general 
rule regarding the recovery of deposition costs is that a 
party may recover deposition costs as long as the trial 
court is persuaded that [the depositions] were taken in 
good faith and, in the light of the circumstances, appeared 
to be essential for the development and presentation of 
the case." Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, 'ii 6, 16 P.3d 549 
(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). The district court "must find that the 
depositions were essential because they were used in a 
meaningful way at trial, or because the development of the 
case was of such a complex nature that the information 
in the depositions could not be obtained through less 
expensive means of discovery." Id. 'ii 11. 
'jj38 Plaintiffs argue that the costs for the depositions of 
Penunuri, Mother, and one of Penunuri's friends (Friend) 
"were not necessary and the information in the Motion for 
Summary Judgment certainly could have been obtained 
through less expensive means." However, the district court 
did not decide that the depositions were essential "because 
the development of the case was of such a complex nature 
that the information in the depositions could not be 
obtained through less expensive means of discovery." See 
id. In fact, the court stated, "I haven't really reached a 
conclusion as to whether or not this case was of such a 
complex nature that ... less expensive discovery could have 
been obtained." 
'jj39 Instead, the court considered whether the depositions 
were used "in a meaningful way" in resolving the case 
through summary judgment. 5 The court, in considering 
Penunuri's deposition, found that "her deposition was 
16) 171 'jj36 Plaintiffs contend that the district court used in a very meaningful way in establishing the 
"erred when it determined that Rocky Mountain was undisputed facts for the purpose of the motion for 
entitled to the deposition costs in the amount of$2,577.32, summary judgment." The court further stated, "I'm 
together with post-judgment interest, when the same finding and ruling that whether or not it was complex, 
evidence could have been obtained through less expensive this was discovery that had to be done with Ms. Penunuri, 
means." "In reviewing a district court's denial or award through a deposition." The court similarly found that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Penunuri v. Sundance Partners Ltd., 380 P.3d 3 (2016) 
2016 UT App 154 
both Mother's and Friend's depositions were "used in a 
significant way and a meaningful way ... in the motion 
for summary judgment." The court additionally found 
that depositions were required to obtain Mother's and 
Friend's testimony, as "lesser means of discovery were 
either not available or not accurate and ... through their 
deposition[s], they were able to clear up issues and facts." 
140 The district court also found that Penunuri's, 
Mother's, and Friend's depositions "were taken in good 
faith" and that they "appeared to be essential" for the 
development and presentation of the case because they 
were "used in a meaningful way" in resolving the case. 
See id. ~16, 11. Under *11 our deferential standard, this 
is enough. We therefore conclude that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in awarding Rocky Mountain 
costs for the depositions of Penunuri, Mother, and Friend. 
CONCLUSION 
~41 The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
All Citations 
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Footnotes G&) 
1- Senior Judge Russell W. Bench sat by special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 
11-201(6). 
2 When reviewing a district court's rulings on a summary judgment motion, we recite the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63, ,r 7, 147 P.3d 439. 
3 We express no opinion on this unbriefed question. 
4 Solely for purposes of analyzing the summary judgment motion on gross negligence, we assume that the opinion 
testimony of Plaintiffs' proposed expert witness was admissible. 
5 Plaintiffs do not argue that the district court could not analyze whether the depositions were essential under the "used 
in a meaningful way" prong. 
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H. Burt Ringwood, #5787 
A. Joseph Sano, #992S 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Facsimile: (801) 323-2037 
Attorneys for Defendants Sundance Partners, Ltd, 
Sundance Holding, UC, Sundance Development Corp. 
Robert Redford, Redford I 970 Trust, and Rocky Mountain 
Outfitters, L. C. 
IN THE FOURTH RJDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LISA PENUNURI and BARRY SIEGWART, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUNDANCE PAR1NERS, LTD.; 
SUNDANCE HOLDING, LLC: 
SUNDANCE INSTITUTE, INC.; 
ROBERT REDFORD; 
REDFORD 1970 TRUST; 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN OUTFIITERS, L.C.; 
andDOESI-X 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER GRANTING (1) 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REGARDING GROSS 
NEGLIGENCE AND (2) 
DEFENDANTS'ALTERNATIVE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE SC01T EARL AS AN 
EXPERT WITNESS, FINAL ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL AND JUDGEMENT 
Civil No.: 080400019 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court, the Honorable Claudia Laycock 
presiding, on January 31, 2014 at 9:00 a.m., for a hearing on (I) Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment Regarding Gross Negligence and (2) Alternative Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Exclude Scott Earl as an Expert Witness. Defendants were represented 
... 001557 
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by attorneys H. Burt Ringwood and A. Joseph Sano. Plaintiffs were represented by attorney 
Robert D. Strieper. 
The Court, having fully considered the legal memoranda submitted, the arguments of 
counsel, and being fully advised of the issues and law relevant to the pending motions, and for 
the reasons expressed by the Court orally on January 31, 2014 and February 25, 2014 (which are 
incorporated by reference), as well as the theories expressed and argued by Defendants, hereby 
rules as follows: 
I. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ,DJDGMENT REGARDING 
GRoss NEGLIGENCE 
A.GROSSNEGLIGENCESTANDARD 
There is no dispute between the parties concerning the standard applicable to establishing 
a claim of gross negligence under Utah law. "Gross negligence is the failure to observe even 
slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the 
consequences that may result." Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 109 
P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 198S). "Recklessness is subsumed in [Utah's] definition of gross 
negligence." Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, 2009 UT 66, 1 43, 221 P.3d 256. 
"Recklessness includes conduct where 'the actor kn[ew), or ha[d] reason to know, ... of facts 
which create a high degree of risk of physical harm to another, and deliberately proceeds to act, 
or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk.,,, Id. at 1 42 ( quoting 
Restatement (Second) o/Torts § 500 cmt. a (196S)). See also Doe v. Doe, 818 P.2d 1161, 1163 
n. l ( explaining that recklessness requires that there be a "strong probability" that hann may 
result). "[T]o carry a claim of gross negligence, [plaintiffs] are required to show conduct that not 
2-
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only demonstrates 'an unreasonable risk of physical hann to another' but also that 'such risk is 
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent." Milne v. USA 
Cycling, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1287-88 (D. Utah 2007) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts§ 500 (196S)). 
While ordinarily summary judgment is inappropriate in cases of alleged gross negligence. 
summary judgment can be properly granted where, based on the undisputed facts, ''[i]t cannot be 
reasonably asserted that [the defendant] 'show[ed] utter indifference"' towards the plaintiff's 
care. Blaisdell v. Dentrix Dental Systems. Inc., 2012 UT 37, ~ 17,284 P.3d 616. 
B. UNDISPUTED FACTS AS FOUND BY THE COURT 
1. On August 1, 2007, Plaintiff Lisa Penunuri and two friends, Barbara Black and 
Suz.anne Moag, participated in a horseback trail ride at the Sundance Resort located in Provo 
Canyon. 
2. After having dinner at the Sundance Resort, Plaintiff and her friends left for the 
Sundance stables, arriving between 5:00 p.m. and S:30 p.m. The horseback trail ride was 
scheduled for 6:00 p.m. 
3. The trail ride at Sundance was operated by Defendant Rocky Mountain Outfitters 
("RMO"). Ashley Wright guided the ride for Plaintiff, her two friends, and two others, Kate Fort 
and her daughter, Haley. 
4. Ashley Wright grew up around horses and worked as a trail guide with RMO 
from the summer of 2004 through the fall of 2008. 
5. Ashley, as with all of RMO's guides, was CPR certified and received training at 
3-
.. OQJ.555 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the beginning of each season on horseback trail guiding. During her deposition, Ashley testified: 
Q. What does the training, the yearly training, entail? 
A. Everything. 
Q. Meaning? 
A. Getting to know the horses, knowing the trails, how to tack/untack, how to do 
arena lessons. Care and maintenance of the horses. How to take out guided tours, 
dealing with guests. Safety reasons. Precautions, I guess. 
(A. Wright Dep., pp. 12-13, Ex. 2 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of MSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
6. Before embarking on the trail ride, Plaintiff and the other participants received a 
Horseback Riding Release which, among other things, warned of the risks involved in horseback 
riding. In pertinent part, the Release states: 
I, the undersigned, . . . understand that horseback riding, sleigh riding or horse 
drawn wagons (collectively "Horseback riding") involve SIGNIFICANT RISK 
OF SERIOUS PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR EVEN 
DEATH. The risks include NA TIJRAL, MAN-MADE, ENVIRONMENT AL 
CONDITIONS AND INHERENT RISKS, including changing weather, mud, 
rocks, variations in steepness, terrain, natural and man-made obstacles, equipment 
failure and the negligence of others. "Inherent risk" with regard to equine or 
livestock activities means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part 
of equine or livestock activities, which may include: (a) the propensity of the 
animal to behave in ways that may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or 
around them; (b) the unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside 
stimulation such as sounds, sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects, persons, or 
other animals; ( c) collisions with other animals or objects; or ( d} the potential of a 
participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the 
participant or others, such as failing to maintain control over the animal or not 
acting within his or her ability. 
(Horseback Riding Release, Ex. 3 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
7. Plaintiff acknowledged having signed the Horseback Riding Release, but testified 
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that she only "scanned through it [and) didn't read thoroughly through it." (L. Penunuri Dep., 
pp. 121-22, Ex. 1 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
8. In addition to the warnings listed in the Horseback Riding Release, two signs 
were posted at Sundance, one in the building where guests sign the Horseback Riding Release 
and the other near the horse arena; both signs provide further warnings to participants of the 
inherent risks associated with horseback riding. 
9. After Plaintiff and her group finished filling out paperwork, they gathered outside 
near the horses. Plaintiff's friend, Suzanne Moag, recalls RMO's guide, Ashley, giving Lisa and 
Haley general instructions during that time. Suzanne testified: 
Q. During that time do you recall what instructions or anything that was given 
before the group set out on the ride? 
A. I believe Ashley told Lisa and Haley gave, them some instructions. Barb and 
I just asked about the temperament of the horses and the names of them. 
Q. What kind of instructions do you recall Ashley giving Lisa and Haley? 
A. Just about mounting the horse, and I remember when we started out, the 
horses, Haley's horse and Lisa's horse kept eating. 
Q. Grazing? 
A. Yes; and it was very difficult for Haley to keep the horse,s head up. 
Q. Do you recall any instructions given by Ashley discouraging them from letting 
~e horse's graze? 
A. Yes. I remember Ashley saying "pull up," "pull up." And Haley was very 
small and she was not strong enough to keep yanking the horse's head up. 
Q. Any instructions about, you know, using the reins, doing this will make the 
horse go left or right or anything like that? 
A. Oh, I'm sure, but I can't recall it I don't listen to that. 
5-
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(S. Moag Dep., pp. 19-20, Ex. 6 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of MSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
t O. Kate Fort similarly recalls Ashley giving general instructions before embarking 
on the ride. She testified: 
Q. What's the next thing you remember? 
A. Oetting in a line. "Once you're on the horse, lean the reins this way to go 
right, this way to go left, and don't let them eat." You know, you got a little bit of 
instruction. 
(K. Fort Dep., p. 22, Ex. 7 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of MSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
11. Ashley, the RMO guide, led the group and was in front during the entire ride. As 
the group headed out from the Sundance stables, Haley, Kate and Lisa were the first three riders, 
with Barbara and Susan in the back. (A. Wright Dep., 38: 13-16, Ex. 2 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. 
of MSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
12. About 45 minutes into the ride, the group came to the Stewart Falls Meadow. At 
that point, the order of the riders changed, with Barbara and SU1.8Me directly behind Ashley, 
followed by Kate Fort, her daughter Haley, and Lisa. (See A. Wright Dep., 40:2-12, Ex. 2 to 
Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of MSJ Re: Gross Neglience.) 
13. After departing from the Stewart Falls Meadow, Lisa and Haley struggled to keep 
their horses from grazing, which in twn caused their horses to lag behind slightly. Lisa testified 
that, at that point, she was "still trying to get the hang of the horse grazing." (See L. Penunuri 
Dep., 138:7-8, Ex. 1 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) Kate Fort testified: 
Q. Were there any problems with any of the riders getting too far behind the 
others? 
A. Once the order changed - up to Stewart Falls, we were pretty much in line. 
6-
.- 001-552 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Nobody really lagged behind, but once the order changed, there were definitely 
stretches where some were further behind than others, specifically Haley and 
Lisa. 
(K.. Fort Dep., 40:13-19, Ex. 7 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) Ms. Fort 
further testified: 
Q. So were there any points where, you know, you weren't able to see Haley? 
A. There was never a point where I wasn't able to see her. 
Q. Okay. 
A. There were times where I would definitely encourage her to yank on the reins 
to get the horse's head up to keep it moving. ''Come on, baby. You've got to 
keep up with the group." But never a point where I couldn't see her. 
Q. Was Lisa having problems with her horse grazing, too? 
A. Yes. 
(K.. Fort Dep., 40:23-25; 41:1-10, Ex. 7 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
14. Ms. Fort testified that during the ride RMO's guide, Ashley, instructed the riders, 
"Pull up on the reins. Don't let them eat" (K. Fort Dep., 41:20-22, Ex. 7 to Defs.' Mem. in 
Supp. ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
15. Regarding the distance between her horse, Haley's horse and Plaintiff's horse, 
Ms. Fort testified: 
. . . We continued on the rest of the trail ride. I'm repeatedly turning around, 
specifically to check on my daughter, noticing - -you know, she was still having 
trouble with her horse, as was [Plaintiff], and they were both lagging behind, so 
Haley would have been a number of horse lengths behind my horse, and Plaintiff 
a number behind Haley. 
Nothing else is really notable to the point where Lisa fell off .... 
(K. Fort Dep., 42:2-10, Ex. 7 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of MSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
7-
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t 6. In an effort to keep the group together, Ashley testified that she had been 
"slowing down the whole ride." (A. Wright Dep., 67:8-13, Ex. 1 to Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. 
ofMSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
17. When that did not work because of Haley being unable to keep her horse from 
grazing, Ashley informed the group that they would be stopping at a clearing in about 100 feet so 
that she could go back and take the lead rope of Haley's horse and pony it the rest of the way. 
18. As Ashley was turning around to pony Haley's horse, Plaintiff fell off the back of 
her horse. 
19. Regarding her fall from the horse, Plaintiff testified: 
Q. . .. Why don't you describe what you remember about the fall. 
A. Okay. I remember being on the horse, and we were beginning the climb, and 
then Haley's horse grazed - - stopped to graze. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And then her - - I guess - - you know, my horse was stopped behind hers, and 
my horse started going, and it was • • it was a rougher ride than I remember 
having had before, other than, you know, with other grazing episodes my horse 
would, you know, kind of giddyup a little faster than it had been going, because 
Haley's horse would start up and then mine would start up, too, and then would 
slow down. And this particular incident, it seemed even rougher than, you know, 
the giddyup that I had gotten in other stops. And then I don't remember anything 
until I was on the ground. 
(L. Penunuri Dep., pp. 114-11S, Ex. 1 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. ofMSJ Re: Oross Negligence.) 
20. On January 3, 2008, Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendants for injuries she 
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sustained as a result of her fall and alleged claims of negligence and gross negligence.1 
21. On November 30, 2009, Plaintiff designated Scott Earl as an expert witness 
regarding horse behavior and the dangers associated with riding horses. 
22. In his expert report, Mr. Earl expresses several opinions based on his review of 
the depositions and other discovery materials in this case. 
23. During his deposition, Mr. Earl testified that there is no evidence in this case 
indicating that RMO's guide, Ashley, exercised no care or acted in willful disregard for the care 
of others. Mr. Earl testified: 
Q. Is there anything that you've seen in the facts of this case, as you understand 
it, that would indicate that Ashley Wright acted with no care at all? 
A. No. 
(S. Earl Dep., 71 :24-25; 72:1-2, Ex. 10 to Defs.' Mot for Summ. J. Re: Oross Negligence.) Mr. 
Earl further testified: 
Q. Is there anything that you see in the record that indicates that Ashley acted 
intentionally or - -
A. Absolutely not 
Q. - - in willful disregard for the care - -
A. No. 
Q. Is there anything in the report that would indicate to you that she acted with no 
care? 
A. No. 
(S. Earl Dep., 87: I 0-17, Ex. 10 to Defs.' Mot for Summ. J. Re: Oross Negligence.) 
I On March 30, 2010, this Court entered an order dismissing all of Plaintiffs' ordinaty negligence-based claims as a 
matter of law, leaving only Plaintiffs' claim for gross negligence. The Court's ruling was subsequently upheld on 
appeal. 
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24. During his deposition, Mr. Earl testified that he does not know what caused 
Plaintiff's horse to accelerate, but gave several possible reasons. He stated: 
A. There's several factors that could have - - or, in my opinion, several things 
that could have startled that horse and caused it to start running, going around a 
blind curve, not seeing the other horses at the time, being a distance, wanting to 
catch up. I'm not even saying it was startled. 
Q. Just may have wanted to catch up? 
A. Yes, and they will accelerate to catch up. 
(S. Earl Dep., 61:4-15, Ex. 10 to Defs.' MSJ Re: Oross Negligence.) 
25. Mr. Earl has testified that there is no way to predict when a horse might 
accelerate. During his deposition, Mr. Earl stated: 
A. . . . Quick acceleration. 
Q. Is there any way to predict that? 
A. There's no way to predict any ofit. It's an animal. You can minimize the risk 
by doing certain things. 
Q. But there's always that inherent risk with an animal, you don't know what 
they're going to do? 
A. That's right 
(S. Earl Dep., 14:11-22, Ex. 10 to Defs.' MSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) He further testified: 
Q. Is it possible that [Plaintiff] fell off the horse, in your opinion, because - .. I 
mean, is it possible that Lisa could have prevented the horse from trotting? 
A. If she knew what she was doing, yes. 
Q. She could have, like she did many times on the ride, and not fall off the horse 
when it accelerated? 
A. It's always possible when a horse accelerates, in my experience, and many 
times when a horse accelerates, it's usually unexpected, and the most experienced 
1 
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riders can come awfully close to falling off. 
Q. That's just one of the inherent risks of riding a horse? 
A. That's part ofit When a horse accelerates, you better be ready. 
(S. Earl Dep., 74:6-25; 7S:1-13, Ex. 10 to Defs.' MSJ Re: Gross Negligence.) 
C. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs have presented no evidence upon which reasonable minds could conclude that 
Defendants' guide, Ashley Wright, exercised no care. Nor have Plaintiffs presented any 
evidence to show that Ashley Wright knew or had reason to know of facts that would have 
created a high degree of risk of physical hann to Plaintiff Penunuri, but deliberately proceeded to 
act, or failed to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk. See Daniels, 2009 UT 
66 at 142 (quoting Restatement (Second) o/Torts § 500 cmt. a (196S)). 
In this case, Plaintiffs designated Scott Earl as their expert witness. While Mr. Earl has 
been excluded from offering expert opinion testimony (see infra), even Mr. Earl has testified that 
he was aware of no evidence in this case showing that Ashley Wright exercised no care or acted 
with willful disregard. The undisputed facts establish that Ashley Wright, among other things, 
lead Plaintiff Penunuri and the other guests during the trail ride, that she attempted to slow down 
the ride to keep the riders closer together, and (when that did not work because Haley's horse 
had stopped to graze) gathered the other riders in a clearing to make room for her to go back and 
take the lead rope of Haley's uncooperative horse to pony it the rest of the way. Based on the 
undisputed facts of this case, the Court finds it cannot be reasonable asserted that Defendants 
"showed utter indifference." See Blaisdell, 2012 UT 37, ~17 (finding that summary judgment on 
a claim of gross negligence was appropriately granted where the undisputed facts established that 
I 
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the plaintiff would be unable to show the defendant acted with utter indifference). 
The Court rejects Plaintiffs' assertion that "gross negligence" may be established merely 
by showing that Ashley Wright failed to follow all of the guidelines suggested in Defendant 
Rocky Mountain Outfitters' employee manual, as internal guidelines or recommendations do not 
establish a tort law duty or standard of care. See Jenkins v. Jordan Valley Water Conservancy 
Dist., 2013 UT 59, 744 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (October I, 2013). 
In addition to the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that summary judgment in favor 
of the Defendants is appropriate because Plaintiffs have presented no evidence beyond 
speculation concerning causation. To succeed on their claim, Plaintiffs must establish that 
Defendants' gross negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiff Penunuri's injury. Under 
Utah law, proximate cause is defined as "that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without which the result 
would not have occurred.'' Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 691 P.2d 240,245 (Utah 198S). When 
the issue of proximate cause is left to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law. See Harline 
v. Barker, 912 P.2d 443 (Utah 1996). 
It is alleged that Plaintiff Penunuri fell and was injured because her horse accelerated 
unexpectedly. No one knows what caused the horse to accelerate unexpectedly. Plaintiffs' own 
expert, Scott Earl, testified that there are multiple reasons why Plaintiff Penunuri's horse could 
have accelerated unexpectedly, including "going around a blind curve, not seeing the other 
horses at the time, being a distance, [or] wanting to catch up," and he testified that there is no 
way to predict when a horse might accelerate, it is one of the "inherent risks" of riding a horse. 
(See S. Earl Dep., 61:8-15; 14:15-22, Ex. 1 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for MSJ Regarding 
1 
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Gross Negligence.) Plaintiffs have argued that what caused the horse to accelerate is not 
relevant, and even speculate that there were "probably multiple causes . ., (See Pits., Opp'n 
M~m., p. 16.) Plaintiffs seem to take the position that, regardless of what caused the horse to 
accelerate, Defendants' guide should have prevented the horse from acting unpredictably. 
Utah law recognizes that horseback riding involves "inherent risks" that are an integral 
part of equine activities. See Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-4-201. These risks include, among other 
things, "the unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside stimulation such as sounds, 
sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects, persons, or other animals." See id (emphasis added). 
Because Plaintiff has not, without engaging in impermissible speculation, presented any 
evidence establishing that Defendants' conduct was the proximate cause of the horse's 
unexpected acceleration, as opposed to the various "inherent risks" associated with horseback 
riding, Plaintiffs' claim fails as matter of law. 
II, DEFENDANTS' ALTERNATIVE MOTION FQR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE SCOT[ EARL AS AN EXPERT WITNESS 
A. EXPERT TESTIMONY IN CLAIMS OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE AND RULE 702 
Neither party has directed the Court to a standard of care applicable to commercial 
horseback trail guiding that is fixed by law. Under Utah law, "where a standard of care is not 
'fixed by law,' the detennination of the appropriate standard is a factual issue to be resolved by 
the finder of fact." Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 82S (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
"Identification of the proper standard of care is a necessary precondition to assessing the degree 
to which conduct deviates, if at all, from the standard of care - the core test in any claim of gross 
negligence." Berry v. Greater Park City, 2007 UT 87, 130, 171 P.3d 442. In this regard, expert 
1 
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testimony may be helpful in order for the fact finder to detennine the defendant's deviation from 
the industry standard. See Wycalis9 780 P.2d at n. 8 ("Where the average person has little 
understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or professions:, expert testimony must 
ordinarily be presented to establish the standard of care.") 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert testimony. 
The Rule:, which is divided into three sections:, provides: 
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis 
for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or 
methods that are underlying in the testimony 
(b )(1) are reliable, 
(b )(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and 
{b )(3) have been reliably applied to the facts. 
{c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the underlying 
principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of 
their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant 
expert community. 
Utah R. Evid. 702. 
To protect against the improper admission of expert testimony, this Court bas been given 
a "gatekeeper" responsibility "to screen out unreliable expert testimony" and to approach 
"proposed expert testimony with 'rational skepticism,,, as it assesses such testimony. See Utah 
R. Evid. 702, 2011 Advisory Committee Note. 
I 
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B. UNDISPUTED FACTS AS FOUND BY THE COURT 
1. In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were grossly negligent "when 
[Defendants'] employees acted in reckless disregard to the public safety by failing to keep the 
herd together, causing the horses to act in a very dangerous yet predictable manner." {Compl.,, 
36). 
2. On November 30, 2009, Plaintiff designated Scott Earl as a liability expert 
witness with "extensive knowledge of horses and horse behavior." (Pits.' Liability Expert 
Designation, p. 2, Ex. 1 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Alternative MSJ.) 
3. In his expert report, Mr. Earl expresses several opinions based on his review of 
the depositions and other discovery materials in this case. (See generally Scott Earl Report, Ex. 
2 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Alternative MSJ.) 
4. At the time of his deposition, Mr. Earl owned six horses and testified that he has 
had horses his entire adult life. (See S. Earl Dep., 5:6-13, Ex. 3.) 
S. Mr. Earl has never owned a trail guiding business, but testified that as a teenager 
in the early l 980s, he worked one summer as a ranch hand for Desert Springs Country Club and 
two summers as a trail guide for Jeremy Ranch. During his deposition, Mr. Earl testified: 
Q. Tell me about your experience as a [trail] guide. 
A. What experience do you want to know? I was a ranch hand for Desert Springs 
Country Club, in Grantsville, in 1982. I was a horse guide for the Jeremy Ranch, 
1983 and 1984. 
• •• 
Q. Explain when and what your duties and responsibilities were. 
A. In 1983 and '84, and my responsibilities were taking people on guided horse 
I 
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.. 
rides. 
Q. Was that summer employment? 
A. Yes. 
• •• 
Q. Let me ask you, since you left Jeremy Ranch, and that would have been back 
in '84? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you acted as a guide since that time? 
A. No. 
(S. Earl Dep., 6:5-9; 10:11-16; 20:12-16, Ex. 3 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Alternative MSJ.) 
6. During his deposition, Mr. Earl testified that he was not familiar with the industry 
standards applicable to the trail guiding business. He testified: 
Q. Can you tell me what the industry standard would be with respect to the 
number of guides that are required? 
A. I don't know the industry standard. I think that depends on your group of 
horses and the group of riders. And I'm not even sure there is an industry 
standard. 
• •• 
Q. So let me ask you, in terms of trail guides and running a trail, you've never 
owned a trail guide business; right? 
A. No. 
Q. With respect to trail guides, there's really not - .. is there a publication or 
regulations or something that I can go to to figure out what the industry standard 
would be? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Do you have any idea how we would determine what the industry standard 
1 
6-
... 0015~2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
would be? 
A. Well, most of it's common sense. And among horse people, it's not that hard 
to figure out what works and doesn't work, but I don't know where you would 
come up with a standard. 
• •• 
Q. Do you know of an indusby standard with respect to the • -
A. I don't know of any industry standard. 
Q. - -with respect to the gap [between horses), that becomes a problem? 
A. It's all in my experience, but in my years of riding is where I get my opinion 
from. 
(S. Earl Dep., 19:11-17; 20:25; 21:14; 24:3-9, Ex. 3 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Alternative 
MSJ.) 
7. During his deposition, Mr. Earl expressed the opinion that RMO's guide, Ashley 
Wright, had a responsibility to keep gaps from forming between the horses on the trail ride. He 
testified: 
A. . .. - - it was still her responsibility to keep gaps from forming. 
Q. And again, you're not able to point to - -you're not able to tell me where, in 
the industry standards or guidelines, that would indicate that that would be 
negligence, are you? 
A. No. 
Q. That's just based upon your own experience? 
A. It's based upon my experience, and my opinion. 
Q. And that somebody else could obviously not think that's negligent at all; 
right? 
A. Somebody could. Everybody has a different opinion. 
1 
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(S. Earl Dep., 48:7-20, Ex. 3 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Alternative MSJ .) 
C. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing the standard of care applicable to commercial 
horseback trail guiding. Plaintiffs also bear the burden of establishing that it was Defendants' 
gross negligence that caused Plaintiff Penunuri' s horse to accelerate unexpectedly, resulting in 
her falling to the ground. Because the standard of care applicable to commercial trail guiding 
and the issue of what caused Plaintiff's horse to accelerate are both outside the knowledge and 
experience of the average layperson, the Court fmds that Plaintiffs must present expert opinion 
testimony on these issues. See Wycalis, 780 P .2d 821, n. 8. 
Plaintiffs designated Scott Earl as their expert to testify concerning the applicable 
standard of care and causation. According to Plaintiffs' Liability Expert Witness Designation, 
Mr. Earl "is a Sheriff with Salt Lake County and liaison with the mounted posse and member of 
the Salt Lake mounted patrol who has extensive knowledge of horses and horse behavior.'' (See 
Pits.' Liability Witness Designation, Ex. 1 to Defs! Mem. in Supp. of Alternative MSJ.) The 
fact that Mr. Earl is generally knowledgeable about horses is not disputed. Mr. Earl, however, 
has very limited knowledge and experience concerning commercial horseback trail guiding. 
Over thirty years ago, as a teenager, Mr. Earl spent one summer working as a ranch hand 
at Desert Springs Country Club, and then spent two summers working as a trail guide at Jeremy 
Ranch. Mr. Earl's last experience working as a trail guide was while working at Jeremy Ranch 
during the summer of 1984. In addition, Mr. Earl repeatedly testified during his deposition that 
he is not familiar with the industry standards applicable to the trail guiding business. He also 
1 
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testified that his opinions are based on what he believes to be common sense. 
Under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the Court finds that Mr. Earl is not 
qualified to render expert opinion testimony concerning the standard of care applicable to 
commercial horseback trail guiding. Based on his lack of experience in commercial horseback 
trail guiding, the Court also finds Plaintiffs have failed to make the ''threshold showing" that Mr. 
Earl's opinions have "a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability," as required under 
Rule 702. The Court finds that Mr. Earl's opinions consist of his own subjective beliefs, and that 
his opinions will not assist the ttier of fact understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue in 
this case. The Court finds that Mr. Earl's experience with horses is largely limited to his own 
personal recreation. He has not owned or managed a commercial horseback trail guiding 
business and, except for brief summer employment as a teenager thirty years ago, has never 
guided a commercial trail ride made up of riders with unknown experience and abilities. 
Regarding the issue of causation specifically, Mr. Earl gave sworn deposition testimony 
that there were several factors that could have caused Plaintiff Penunurl's horse to accelerate and 
cause her to fall, a number of which are recognized "inherent risks" associated with horseback 
riding. (See supra.) In a post-deposition affidavit, Mr. Earl contradicts his prior deposition 
testimony by stating that, "[i]t is my opinion that it was Ashley Wright's failure to stop and close 
the gaps at the point when she passed the hikers that caused Ms. Penunuri's horse to accelerate.'' 
(S. Earl Deel.,~ 19, Bx. 3 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Alternative MSJ.) The Court rejects Mr. 
Earl's contradictory testimony and finds that it only further demonstrates the unreliability and 
speculative nature of his opinions. 
The Court also rejects Plaintiffs' argument that the standard of care may be established 
1 
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by evidence that Defendants' guide, Ashley Wright, failed to follow RMO's internal guidelines. 
See Jenkins, 2013 UT 59; 744 Adv. Rep. 8 (October 1, 2013) (holding that the alleged breach of 
internal guidelines cannot be used to establish a tort duty and explaining that expert testimony 
must be presented if the subject matter is beyond the nonnal experience or lmowledge of the 
average layperson); see also, Walker v. Anderson-Oliver Title Ins. Agency, 309 P.3d 267, 274 
(Utah Ct. App. 2013) ("Establishing an industry standard requires more than evidence of a 
particular company's rules and policies. [ ... ] Rather, the standard of conduct which the 
community demands must be an external and objective one, rather than the individual judgment, 
good or ba4, of the particular actor.") (internal quotations omitted.)) 
Having found that Mr. Earl's opinions fail to satisfy the requirements of Rule 702, and 
having found that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden of establishing the standard of care and 
causation without expert testimony, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claim for gross negligence 
must be dismissed as a matter of law. 
The Court also rejects Plaintiffs' argument (asserted for the first time at the hearing on 
January 31, 2014) that they may utilize Defendants' expert witness, Rex Walker, to establish the 
applicable standard of care. Plaintiffs never asserted in their opposition memoranda that they 
intended to use Mr. Walker's testimony in their case-in-chief to establish the standard of care. 
Instead, Plaintiffs relied upon their designated expert, Scott Earl, and attempted to defend his 
qualifications to opine regarding the standard of care. Thus, the Court rejects Plaintiffs' 
argument that they may use Defendants' expert to satisfy their burden in establishing the 
applicable standard of care. 
Pursuant to the foregoing, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED 
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ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Oross Negligence is 
GRANTED; 
2. Defendants' Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Exclude-
Scott Earl as an Expert Witness is GRANTED; 
3. Summary Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs, and 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and all claims contained therein or arising therefrom, alleged or which 
could have been alleged, are dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits, no cause of action; and 
4. Final Judgment, from which an appeal can be taken, is hereby entered in favor of 
Defendants and against Plaintiffs for costs incurred, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. S4(d)(l), in the 
amount of $2,577.32, together with post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 
Approved as to Fonn: 
(Counseldecllnedtosign) 
Robert D. Strieper 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
(Executed and entered by the Court as indieated by the date and seal at the top of this Order] 
CERTIFICATE Qf SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of August, 2014 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order Granting (1) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding 
Gross Negligence and (2) Defendants' Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Motion to Exclude Scott Earl as an Expert Witness, Final Order of Dismissal and 
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Judgment was served by the method indicated below, to the following: 
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Robert D. Strieper 
STRJEPER LAW FIRM 
2366 Logan Way 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) E-file email 
/s/ Michelle Peters 
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The Order of Court~ _)ed below: l-:-:· ~ . ·~\ \ 
Dated: August 16, 201"" Isl cLAup, ;. .. :~;CJK-
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H. Burt Ringwood, #5787 
A. Joseph Sano, #9925 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
I 02 South 200 East, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) S32-7080 
Facsimile: (801) 323-2037 
Attorneys for Defendants Sundance Partners, Ltd., 
Sundance Holding, LLC, Sundance Development Corp. 
Robert Redford Redford 1970 Trust, and Rocky Mountain 
Outfitters, L. C. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UT AH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LISA PENUNURI and BARRY SIEOWART,) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) ORDER REGARDING 
) DETERMINATION OF COSTS 
vs.) 
) 
SUNDANCE PARlNERS, LTD.;) 
SUNDANCE HOLDING, LLC: ) 
SUNDANCE INSTITUTE, INC.; ) 
ROBERT REDFORD; ) 
REDFORD 1970 TRUST;) Civil No.: 080400019 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN OUTFITTERS, L.C.;) 
and DOES I-X } Judge Claudia Laycock 
) 
Defendants. ) 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court, the Honorable Claudia Laycock presiding, on 
June 19, 2014 at I :30 p.m., for a hearing regarding Determination of Costs. Defendants were 
represented by attorney AJ. Sano. Plaintiffs were represented by attorney Robert D. Strieper. 
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The Court, having fully considered the legal memoranda submitted, the arguments of counsel, and 
being fully advised of the issues and relevant law, and for the reasons expressed by the Court orally 
at the hearing on June 19, 2014 (which is incorporated by reference), hereby rules as follows: 
Regarding the recovery of depositions costs, as a general rule, a party may recover deposition costs 
as long as the "trial court is persuaded that (the depositions] were taken in good faith and, in the 
light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development and presentation of the 
case." Young v. Stale, 2000 UT 91, ,r6, 16 P.Jd 549. See also Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 
774 (Utah 1980) ("a majority of this Court has approved the taxing as costs the taking of 
depositions, but subject to the limitation that the trial court is persuaded that they were taken in good 
faith and, in the light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development and 
presentation of the case.") "[D]eposition costs can be recoverable if the trial court determines that 
the deposition was essential to the case, either because the deposition was used in some meaningful 
way at trial or because the development of the case was of such a complex nature that the 
information provided by the deposition could not have been obtained through less expensive means 
of discovery.") 
In this case, Defendants seek the deposition costs of Plaintiff Lisa Penunwi ($840.09), Kate Fort 
($493.07), SU7.811ne Moag ($754.56). and Scott Earl ($452.60), as well as the statutory witness fee 
for Kate Fort ($18.S0} and Scott Earl ($18.50).' 
As a preliminary matter, the Coun finds no evidence that any of the above depositions were not 
taken in good faith. The Court further finds that each of the depositions were used in a meaningful 
way in Defendants' motions for summary judgment and were necessary to development of this 
complex case. With respect to Plaintiff Lisa Penunuri, her deposition was used to establish the facts 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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surrounding the accident and her knowing and voluntary asset to the pre-injury release she signed 
prior to embarking on the horseback trail ride. Regarding Kate Fort and Susan Moag, the Court 
fmds that their depositions were used meaningfully by Defendants to establish that there was no 
evidence Defendants' guide exercised no care or acted with utter indifference toward the safety of 
those on the trail ride. Concerning Scott Earl, the Court finds that his deposition was used 
meaningfully and extensively by Defendants in establishing that he was aware of no evidence that 
would support Plaintiffs' gross negligence claim and that he lacked the expertise necessary to render 
opinion testimony concerning the standard of care applicable to the commercial horseback trail 
guiding industry. 
THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED ADJUGED AND DECREED that Defendants be awarded 
deposition costs and witness fees in the total amount of $2,577.32, together with post-judgment 
interest as allowed by law. 
This order concludes the final issue in this matter. This is a final order, and this case is now ready 
for appeal. 
Approved as to Form: 
Declined to sign 
Robert D. Strieper 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
(Executed and entered by tbe Court as Indicated by the date and seal at the top oftbis Order} 
!_lftl505 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.,. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this lm day of July, 2014, a ttue and correct copy of the foregoing Order 
Regarding Determination of Costs was served by the method indicated below, to the following: 
Robert D. Strieper () U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Strieper Law Finn ( ) Hand Delivered 
2366 Logan Way ( ) Overnight Mail 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 () Facsimile 
(X) E-file email 
Isl Michelle Peters 
001781.00009 
Defendants' Memorandum of Costs included additional costs and witness fees. However, prior to the hearing, 
Defendants stipulated to the withdrawal of all but the costs and witness fee listed above. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
